05000498/FIN-2009002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Reportability Misses an Inoperable Component Cooling Water Train |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.7.3 for an inadequate reportability review on the Train A component cooling water low-level actuation switch which failed during surveillance testing. On October 14, 2008, during the 18-month surveillance test, Unit 2 component cooling water Train A was determined to be inoperable due to the failure of system valves to actuate to their designated positions. The inspectors continued to ask questions related to the event and discovered that the last time the switch was manipulated was January 22, 2008, during a calibration procedure. After the inspectors questioned the reportability, engineering reviewed it and determined that the calibration procedure did not have a functional check of the switch internal contacts before restoration. Engineering concluded that, as a result of the switch not being functionally checked after the calibration, that the wire must have become disconnected during the restoration section of the procedure. Consequently, from January 22, 2008 through October 16, 2008, the Train A component cooling water low-low level switch was inoperable and therefore reportable. The licensee performed a root cause of the event itself and an apparent cause for operations inappropriately applying time of discovery for the initial reportability review under Condition Reports 08-15541 and 08-19420, respectively. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that inadequate operability/reportability reviews could result in a degraded system being returned to service, and it affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of human performance and the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 worksheets from Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in the actual loss of safety function of one or more trains and it did not screen as risk significant due to seismic, flooding, fire, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had Problem Identification and Resolution crosscutting aspects associated with the corrective action program P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate for operability and reportability conditions adverse to quality (Section 1R15) |
Site: | South Texas ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000498/2009002 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Dixon B Tharakan S Graves J Adams W Walker W Sifre B Larson C Ryan |
CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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