05000483/FIN-2013003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Appropriately Pre-plan and Perform Maintenance on the Unit Auxiliary Transformer |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), involving the failure to appropriately pre-plan and perform maintenance on equipment that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and perform maintenance on the unit auxiliary transformer that contributed to a fire. During Refueling Outage 19, the unit auxiliary transformer was providing power to non-safety house loads and train B battery chargers when it experienced a phase to phase short and fire in the surge capacitor. The fire and loss of power affected the performance of safety-related batteries and battery chargers, and led to manual actuations of the reactor protection system. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201302877. Corrective actions included installing new surge protectors on the unit auxiliary transformer, revising station procedures for connecting and disconnecting the surge protectors, and ordering new surge capacitors for the startup transformer. The failure to appropriately pre-plan and perform maintenance on equipment that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the fault and fire led to a loss of power to mitigating systems while the reactor was shutdown. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 4, PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23\'OR PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> And Inventory in the Pressurizer, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee maintained adequate event mitigation capabilities, the event did not result in a change in reactor coolant system inventory or temperature, and it did not require a quantitative risk assessment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with the resources component because the licensee failed to ensure that the equipment and maintenance procedures were adequate to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2013003 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Smagacz T Hartman W Sifre J Dykert J Laughlin L Carson N Greene N O'Keefe |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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