:on 880426,MSIV Closure Time Testing Was Not Adequate,Due to Procedural Inadequacy.Revised DPS 9061.09 to Account for Full Valve Travel & Verified MSIV Operability Before Plant Start Up| ML20141C479 |
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Clinton  |
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| Issue date: |
06/18/1997 |
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| From: |
Allen J ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML20141C478 |
List: |
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| References |
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| LER-97-014, LER-97-14, NUDOCS 9706250245 |
| Download: ML20141C479 (4) |
|
text
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1 SiON APPROVED BY Q K9 NO. 31504104 (4-95)
EZPIRES C4/30/96 ESTIMATED SUT.OEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THl3 MANDATO;1Y INFORMATION COLLECYlON REQUE ST: 50.0 F RS.
REPORTED LE SSONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
LEARNED ARE iNCORPORATEo wr0 THE LiCENsiNo PROCESS ANo FED BACx TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THEi INFORMATION AND RECOROS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T 6 F33L U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 205554001. AND (See reverse for required number of TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104h OFFICE OF digits / characters for each block)
M ANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.
FAcEJTV NAME (1) doc KET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Clinton Power Statl0n 05000461 1 OF 4 TITLE G3 Main Steam isolation Valves Closure Time Out of Technical Specifications Due to Procedural Inadequacy EVEPIT DATF m)
LER NUMBER f B REPORT D ATF (71 OTHER FACILfTIES INV 3LVED f BI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL RE VibiON MONTH DAY YEAR F AciuTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBE R NUMBER None 05000 04 26 88 97 014 00 06 18 97
'^CiuTY NAME DOCxET NuMsER None 05000 i
OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)
M!DE (9) 4 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
So.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71
- ;M 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER
.jd 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)
Specify in Abstract below r in NRC Form 368A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
UCMCONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
J. C. Allen, Senior Engineer (217) 935-8881, Extension 4046 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT M ANUF AC TURER PEPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT M ANUF ACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15)
YES X
NO (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
With the plant in COLD SHUTDOWN and the sixth refueling outage in progress, a review of instrument accuracy for compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) was being performed. During the review it was determined that Clinton Power Station procedure 9061.09, which satisfies TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.6 governing Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure time testing, was not adequate because it did not account for full valve travel.
Faulty data from CPS 9061.09 was also used in procedure 9432.30 to satisfy TS SR 3.3.6.1.7 for MSIV system response time testing. Consequently, there have been several instances since April 26, 1988, where the MSIV valve and system closure times have not been within TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 and TS SR 3.3.6.1.7.
The cause of this event was determined to be procedural inaccuracy.
Corrective actions include revising CPS 9061.09 to account for full valve travel, verifying MSIV operability before plant start up, and training plant operators on the MSIV limit switch configuration and position indication.
9706250245 970618 PDR ADOCK 05000461 S
PDR NF.C FOHM 366 (4 95)
i
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATC RY COMMISSION 14-9 6)
LICENBEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i TEXT CONTINUATION l
FAc1LITY NAME fil DOCKET LER NUMBER tm PAGE f 31 YEAR SEQUENTIAL W SON NUMMR Clinton Power Station 05000461 97 014 00 2
OF 4
TEXT (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) til)
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On May 20, 1997, with the plant in Mode 4 (COLD SHUTDOWN) with reactor coolant temperature l
b31ng maintained between 100 and 120 degrees Fahrenheit and reactor pressure at zero pounds per square inch, the sixth refueling outage (RF-6) was in progress. A review of instrument cccuracy for compliance with the Technical Specifications was being performed in response l
to cn Information Notice received from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
Nuclear Network. This review included evaluating the use of a digital stop watch (KI) to me:Iure Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) (ISV) closure time in accordance with CPS 9061.09, "MS/FW System Valve Operability (Cold Shutdown)," and TS SR 3.6.1.3.6.
MSIV cloture time testing in accordance with TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 is required to be performed every sighteen months.
During the investigation it was noted that remote indicating lights located on a panel in th] MCR were used for time testing MSIVs. Each main steam line at CPS has two redundant MSIVs, inboard and outboard. There are two indicating lights for each valve. One of the indicating lights is red and is lit when the valve is ten (10) percent open to one-hundred (100) percent open.
The other indicating light is green and is lit when the valve is nincty (90) percent open to fully closed. Control room operators time MSIV closure from l
wh;n the valve switch is turned, to when the red open light on the MCR panel extinguishes Gt the 90 percent closed position.
CPS procedure 9061.09 requires timing the valve to full clocure, therefore, Condition Report 1-97-05-237 was initiated.
An investigation into this condition concluded that since issuance of the original CPS 9061.09, full MSIV closure has not been accurately measured as required by TS SR 3.6.1.3.6.
Further investigation identified that the incorrect data obtained from performing CPS 9061.09 was also used in CPS 9432.30, "MSIV Isolation System Response Time Test".
This procedure tests instrumentation response time associated with MSIV automatic trip functions to fulfill TS SR 3.3.6.1.7.
The stroke times obtained in CPS 9061.09 are added to the instrument response times of the automatic trip functions to obtain an overall system icolation response time.
Due to incorrect data obtained from CPS 9061.09, system isolation rczponse times were also not accurately measured as required by TS SR 3.3.6.1.7.
A rsview of previous CPS 9061.09 data indicates that MSIV closure time has been recorded as high as five (5) seconds.
If a correction factor is applied to account for full valve I
trcvel, the actual time to closure was approximately 5.55 seconds, 0.55 seconds longer than allowed by the Technical Specification acceptance criteria. This estimate was derived by multiplying the recorded stroke time by 100 and dividing the product by 90.
To meet the mIximum stroke time permitted by TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 using this formula, an MSIV must have l
indicated closed by the red indicating light extinguishing on the MCR panel in 4.5 seconds i
or less. April 26, 1988, with the plant in Mode 4 (COLD SHUTDOWN), was the first of csvaral instances where recorded time measurements have not been within TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 and i
TS SR 3.3.6.1.7 acceptance criteria. These instances have affected four out of the eight MSIVs.-
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$U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
,e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME fil DOCKET LER NUMRF5t (H)
PAGE13)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Clinton Power Station 05000461 97 014 00 3
OF 4
1 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) til)
No automatic or manually initiated safety system response was necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition. No other equipment or components were inoperable at the ctart of this event to the extent that their inoperable condition contributed to this cvsnt.
CAUSE OF EVENT
Th2 cause of this event is attributed to procedural inadequacy.
CPS 9061.09 did not j
include an accurate method to time full valve travel.
Furthermora, Plant Operations l
personnel were not aware that the valve open indicating light extinguishes at the 90 percent closed position instead of the fully closed position. An investigation of this svent identified that the original version of CPS 9061.09 did not contain an accurate method to time full valve stroke. The author and reviewers of the original version of the procedure apparently did not recognize that the "close" valve position indicating light was cst to extinguish at the 90 percent closed and not the fully closed position.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION
t I
i CPS 9061.09 will be revised to account for full valve travel. Operations personnel will be trained on the MSIV limit switch configuration and how it affects the position indicating lights in the MCR.
An engineering evaluation was performed on the most recent MSIV closure rscults performed May 20, 1997. The evaluation determined that one of the eight MSIVs did not meet TS requirements. This MSIV's stroke time will be adjusted and the valve will be ratested to verify TS operability before plant start up.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
l This event is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) due to failure to I
mest requirements of TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 and TS SR 3.6.6.1.7.
MSIV valve and system closure l
times did not meet the acceptance criteria of the Technical Specifications on several occasions since April 26, 1988. This condition went undetected because of deficiencies in CPS 9061.09.
An analysis of the safety consequences and implications identified that this sysnt was not safety significant. Each main steam line at CPS has two MSIVs. No occurrences of both MSIVs in a main steam line failing to meet the acceptance criteria of TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 during the same period were discovered during review of previous performances of surveillance test results. This confirms system isolation response time would have occurred within the criteria of TS SR 3.3.6.1 7 excluding a failure of an MSIV to close. Furthermore, an analysis of this event has determined that isolation during a main steam line rupture is the most limiting scenario for MSIV closure.
Closure time for this accident is based on dose to the general public. The projected dose increase accociated with the last 10 percent of MSIV travel time is inconsequential.
I 1
8[, NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS810N (4 95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FActitTY NAME fil DOCKET LER NUunsa (ii)
PAGE 13)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REMSION BER NUMBER Clinton Power Station 05000461 97 014 00 4
OF 4
TEXT Ilf more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
No equipment or component failed during this event.
l No similar events concerning inadequate MSIV stroke time testing have been reported in rccent history. Additional evaluation is continuing to ensure this situation does not i
l cxist for other stroke-timed valves.
For further information regarding this event, contact J. C. Allen, Senior Engineer, at (217) 935-8881, extension 4046.
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| 05000461/LER-1997-001, :on 970103,nuclear Fuel Supplier Failed to Analyze Turbine Pressure Regulator Downscale Failure Event in off-rated Condition Per 10CFR21.21.Caused by Error in Nuclear Fuel Supplier.Mcpr Will Be Implemented |
- on 970103,nuclear Fuel Supplier Failed to Analyze Turbine Pressure Regulator Downscale Failure Event in off-rated Condition Per 10CFR21.21.Caused by Error in Nuclear Fuel Supplier.Mcpr Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 21.21(c)(4) 10 CFR 21.21(c)(3) | | 05000461/LER-1997-002-01, Forwards LER 97-002-01 Re Failure to Complete TS 3.8.2 LCO Required Action B.4 Due to Personnel Error.Commitment Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-01 Re Failure to Complete TS 3.8.2 LCO Required Action B.4 Due to Personnel Error.Commitment Made within Ltr,Listed | | | 05000461/LER-1997-003, :on 970128,failed to Recongnize Impact of Disconnecting Div 1 IRM Cable While Div 2 IRM Cable Was Disconnected Resulted in 2 Out of 4 RPS Actuation Being Satisfied.Caused by Personnel Error.Counseled Personnel |
- on 970128,failed to Recongnize Impact of Disconnecting Div 1 IRM Cable While Div 2 IRM Cable Was Disconnected Resulted in 2 Out of 4 RPS Actuation Being Satisfied.Caused by Personnel Error.Counseled Personnel
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000461/LER-1997-004, :on 970204,failed to Properly Implement TS SR 3.6.5.3.3 Due to Inadequate Procedure.Revised Surveillance Procedure to Verify Valves Closed |
- on 970204,failed to Properly Implement TS SR 3.6.5.3.3 Due to Inadequate Procedure.Revised Surveillance Procedure to Verify Valves Closed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii) | | 05000461/LER-1997-005-01, Forwards LER 97-005-01 Re Eighteen Containment Penetrations Susceptible to Thermally Induced over-pressurization Due to Unknown Cause.Util Will Modify Seven Containment Penetrations to Eliminate over-pressure Concern | Forwards LER 97-005-01 Re Eighteen Containment Penetrations Susceptible to Thermally Induced over-pressurization Due to Unknown Cause.Util Will Modify Seven Containment Penetrations to Eliminate over-pressure Concern | | | 05000461/LER-1997-006-01, Forwards LER 97-006-01 Re Lack of Coordination of 120 Volt non-safe Shutdown Circuit Breakers in Distribution Panels W/Safe Shutdown Circuit Breakers,Causes Plant to Be Outside Design Basis | Forwards LER 97-006-01 Re Lack of Coordination of 120 Volt non-safe Shutdown Circuit Breakers in Distribution Panels W/Safe Shutdown Circuit Breakers,Causes Plant to Be Outside Design Basis | | | 05000461/LER-1997-006, :on 970219,lack of Coordination of 120 Volt non-safe Shutdown Circuit Breakers in Distribution Panels W/Shutdown Circuit Breakers Causes Plant to Be Outside Its Basis.Corrected Circuit Breaker Problems |
- on 970219,lack of Coordination of 120 Volt non-safe Shutdown Circuit Breakers in Distribution Panels W/Shutdown Circuit Breakers Causes Plant to Be Outside Its Basis.Corrected Circuit Breaker Problems
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000461/LER-1997-007, :on 970227,lack of Procedural Guidelines for Maintaining Seismic Qualification Resulted in Division 3 Switchgear Outside Design Basis.Revised CPS Procedures.W/ |
- on 970227,lack of Procedural Guidelines for Maintaining Seismic Qualification Resulted in Division 3 Switchgear Outside Design Basis.Revised CPS Procedures.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(iv) | | 05000461/LER-1997-008, :on 920408,determined That DG Undervoltage Relays Inoperable Due to Inadequate Process to Review Operability Requirements of Plant Equipment as Defined in Ts.Amend Requested to Change TS |
- on 920408,determined That DG Undervoltage Relays Inoperable Due to Inadequate Process to Review Operability Requirements of Plant Equipment as Defined in Ts.Amend Requested to Change TS
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(c)(2)(v) | | 05000461/LER-1997-009-01, Forwards LER 97-009-01 Re Identification of Surveillance Procedure Which Does Not Adequately Consider Accuracy of Installed Instrumentation in Meeting TS Requirements for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump.Commitments,Liste | Forwards LER 97-009-01 Re Identification of Surveillance Procedure Which Does Not Adequately Consider Accuracy of Installed Instrumentation in Meeting TS Requirements for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump.Commitments,Listed | | | 05000461/LER-1997-011, :on 860929,failed to Verify Breaker Closed at seven-day Frequency Required by TS Due to Omission of Breaker from Surveillance Procedure.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures |
- on 860929,failed to Verify Breaker Closed at seven-day Frequency Required by TS Due to Omission of Breaker from Surveillance Procedure.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000461/LER-1997-013, :on 970508,failure to Adequately Verify That No Trips Existed During Surveillance Test Resulted in Inadvertent Actuation of Sgts.Caused by Personnel Error. Procedure CPS 9532.61 Was Revised |
- on 970508,failure to Adequately Verify That No Trips Existed During Surveillance Test Resulted in Inadvertent Actuation of Sgts.Caused by Personnel Error. Procedure CPS 9532.61 Was Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000461/LER-1997-014, :on 880426,MSIV Closure Time Testing Was Not Adequate,Due to Procedural Inadequacy.Revised DPS 9061.09 to Account for Full Valve Travel & Verified MSIV Operability Before Plant Start Up |
- on 880426,MSIV Closure Time Testing Was Not Adequate,Due to Procedural Inadequacy.Revised DPS 9061.09 to Account for Full Valve Travel & Verified MSIV Operability Before Plant Start Up
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000461/LER-1997-016, :on 970617,failure to Provide Emergency Lighting for Safe Shutdown Equipment as Required by Plant Design Basis Was Noted.Cause Could Not Be Determined.Review of Each Fire Area in SSA Conducted |
- on 970617,failure to Provide Emergency Lighting for Safe Shutdown Equipment as Required by Plant Design Basis Was Noted.Cause Could Not Be Determined.Review of Each Fire Area in SSA Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000461/LER-1997-017, :on 970613,failed to Properly Calibrate MSL Radiation Monitoring.Caused Because Design Document That Provided Setpoints to Be Used Prior to Startup Did Not Address Need to Recalibrate Monitors.Revised Procedure |
- on 970613,failed to Properly Calibrate MSL Radiation Monitoring.Caused Because Design Document That Provided Setpoints to Be Used Prior to Startup Did Not Address Need to Recalibrate Monitors.Revised Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000461/LER-1997-018, :on 970823,inadequate Preventive Maint Led to Possible Failure of Westinghouse Dhp Circuit Breakers to Open on Demand.Performed Corrective Maint Tasks on Dhp Circuit Breakers |
- on 970823,inadequate Preventive Maint Led to Possible Failure of Westinghouse Dhp Circuit Breakers to Open on Demand.Performed Corrective Maint Tasks on Dhp Circuit Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000461/LER-1997-019, :on 860929,switchgear Heat Removal Sys Fan Discharge Damper Control Circuit Routed Through MCR Was Not Per Design Basis Due to Design Error.Installed Temporary Mod to Disconnect Damper Indication to MCR |
- on 860929,switchgear Heat Removal Sys Fan Discharge Damper Control Circuit Routed Through MCR Was Not Per Design Basis Due to Design Error.Installed Temporary Mod to Disconnect Damper Indication to MCR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000461/LER-1997-020, :on 970715,discovered Failure to Document Effect of Degraded Coatings in Containment on Eccs.Caused by Failure of Personnel to Perform Evaluation on Degraded Coatings.Performed Evaluation & Removed Degraded Coatings |
- on 970715,discovered Failure to Document Effect of Degraded Coatings in Containment on Eccs.Caused by Failure of Personnel to Perform Evaluation on Degraded Coatings.Performed Evaluation & Removed Degraded Coatings
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000461/LER-1997-021, Forwards LER 97-021-00 & 10CFR21 Rept 21-97-040,re Control Circuit for Division 1 EDG Feed Breaker Which Did Not Meet Basis Due to Design Error | Forwards LER 97-021-00 & 10CFR21 Rept 21-97-040,re Control Circuit for Division 1 EDG Feed Breaker Which Did Not Meet Basis Due to Design Error | | | 05000461/LER-1997-022-01, Forwards LER 97-022-01 & 10CFR21 Rept 21-97-036 Re Design of DG Ventilation Subsystems Outside Design Basis as Result of Failure to Include Min & Max Outside Air Temps Extremes,Due to Design Error.Ler Contains Listed Commitm | Forwards LER 97-022-01 & 10CFR21 Rept 21-97-036 Re Design of DG Ventilation Subsystems Outside Design Basis as Result of Failure to Include Min & Max Outside Air Temps Extremes,Due to Design Error.Ler Contains Listed Commitments | | | 05000461/LER-1997-023-01, Inadequate Work Instructions Leads to Potential Over-Greasing of Motor Bearings Causing Potential Failure of Various Motors Has Been Canceled | Inadequate Work Instructions Leads to Potential Over-Greasing of Motor Bearings Causing Potential Failure of Various Motors Has Been Canceled | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000461/LER-1997-023, :on 971107,potential Overgreasing of Motor Bearings Causing Potential Failure of Various Motors,Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Work Instructions.Briefed Electrical & Maint Supervisors on Issue |
- on 971107,potential Overgreasing of Motor Bearings Causing Potential Failure of Various Motors,Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Work Instructions.Briefed Electrical & Maint Supervisors on Issue
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000461/LER-1997-024, :on 970830,failure to Comply W/Ts Action Statement to Immediately Restore AC Power Sources Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Interpretation of TS Action. Licensing Providing Staff Guidance |
- on 970830,failure to Comply W/Ts Action Statement to Immediately Restore AC Power Sources Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Interpretation of TS Action. Licensing Providing Staff Guidance
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000461/LER-1997-025, :on 971002,design Deficiency Resulted in Plant Being Outside Design Basis for Fire in Main CR Potentially Damaging Valves Required in Safe Shutdown of Plant.Cause Could Not Be Determined.Will Analyze MOV Control Circuits |
- on 971002,design Deficiency Resulted in Plant Being Outside Design Basis for Fire in Main CR Potentially Damaging Valves Required in Safe Shutdown of Plant.Cause Could Not Be Determined.Will Analyze MOV Control Circuits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000461/LER-1997-026-01, Forwards LER 97-026-01,re Inadequate Procedure for Insp of Shutdown Swps for Excess Silt Which Resulted in Shutdown Swp Inoperability.Commitments Made in Rept,Listed | Forwards LER 97-026-01,re Inadequate Procedure for Insp of Shutdown Swps for Excess Silt Which Resulted in Shutdown Swp Inoperability.Commitments Made in Rept,Listed | | | 05000461/LER-1997-027, :on 900831,installation of Mod of RHR Sys Was Outside Plant Design Basis.Caused by Misinterpretation of 10CFR50.59.Reviewed Current Safety Evaluation Program & Mod to RHR Sys Will Be Installed |
- on 900831,installation of Mod of RHR Sys Was Outside Plant Design Basis.Caused by Misinterpretation of 10CFR50.59.Reviewed Current Safety Evaluation Program & Mod to RHR Sys Will Be Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000461/LER-1997-028, :on 971126,identified Inoperability of All in-service 33 480-volt K-line safety-related Circuit Breakers.Caused by Failure of ABB to Supply Properly Qualified Components Per 10CFR21.Will Replace Components |
- on 971126,identified Inoperability of All in-service 33 480-volt K-line safety-related Circuit Breakers.Caused by Failure of ABB to Supply Properly Qualified Components Per 10CFR21.Will Replace Components
| 10 CFR 21.21(c)(4) 10 CFR 21.21(c)(3) | | 05000461/LER-1997-029, :on 971113,failure to Follow Plant Procedure When Erecting Scaffold Resulted in SR Area Cooler Becoming Inoperable Due to Seismic Qualification Concerns.Caused by Failure to Follow Plant Procedure.Modified Scaffold |
- on 971113,failure to Follow Plant Procedure When Erecting Scaffold Resulted in SR Area Cooler Becoming Inoperable Due to Seismic Qualification Concerns.Caused by Failure to Follow Plant Procedure.Modified Scaffold
| 10 CFR 50.73(c)(2)(ii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1997-030-01, Forwards LER 97-030-01,re Failure to Verify That RWCU Sys Was Available as Alternate Means of Shutdown Cooling Due to Procedural Inadequacy.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-030-01,re Failure to Verify That RWCU Sys Was Available as Alternate Means of Shutdown Cooling Due to Procedural Inadequacy.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | | | 05000461/LER-1997-031, :on 971113,inadequate Testing of SR Logic Circuits Resulted in Failure to Meet TS Sr.Cause Has Not Been Determined.No Actions Have Been Taken at Present Time |
- on 971113,inadequate Testing of SR Logic Circuits Resulted in Failure to Meet TS Sr.Cause Has Not Been Determined.No Actions Have Been Taken at Present Time
| | | 05000461/LER-1997-033, :on 971218,shift Supervisor Recognized That Containment Bldg Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Exhaust Radiation Monitors Declared Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tech Specs.Operations on TS Revised |
- on 971218,shift Supervisor Recognized That Containment Bldg Fuel Transfer Pool Ventilation Plenum Exhaust Radiation Monitors Declared Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tech Specs.Operations on TS Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000461/LER-1997-034-01, Forwards LER 97-034-01 & Part 21 Rept 21-97-051 Re Incorrect Cable Resistance & Brake Horsepower Data Used in Design of Divisions 1 & 2 EDG Vent Fans Which Resulted in Design of Fan Monitors Being Outside Design Basis of Pla | Forwards LER 97-034-01 & Part 21 Rept 21-97-051 Re Incorrect Cable Resistance & Brake Horsepower Data Used in Design of Divisions 1 & 2 EDG Vent Fans Which Resulted in Design of Fan Monitors Being Outside Design Basis of Plant | | | 05000461/LER-1997-034, Forwards 930414 S&L Electrical Engineering Std ESA-102 W/Copyright Statement Removed.Encl Originally Submitted w/980205 Info Re CPS Combined LER 97-034-00 & Part 21 Rept Contained Copyright Statement | Forwards 930414 S&L Electrical Engineering Std ESA-102 W/Copyright Statement Removed.Encl Originally Submitted w/980205 Info Re CPS Combined LER 97-034-00 & Part 21 Rept Contained Copyright Statement | | | 05000461/LER-1997-035-01, Forwards LER 97-035-01,re Divisions 1 & 2 Battery Chargers Incapable of Supplying Full Rated Voltage & Current Flow at Degraded Voltage Trip Setpoint IAW Plant TS & Design Basis.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-035-01,re Divisions 1 & 2 Battery Chargers Incapable of Supplying Full Rated Voltage & Current Flow at Degraded Voltage Trip Setpoint IAW Plant TS & Design Basis.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | | | 05000461/LER-1997-036, :on 971222,engineering Completed Evaluation of Missing Motor Shaft Key That Connects Motor to Fan Hub of Div II Shutdown SW Pump Room Cooler.Caused by Inoperability of Room Cooler.Cooling Fan Restored,Per 10CFR21 |
- on 971222,engineering Completed Evaluation of Missing Motor Shaft Key That Connects Motor to Fan Hub of Div II Shutdown SW Pump Room Cooler.Caused by Inoperability of Room Cooler.Cooling Fan Restored,Per 10CFR21
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4) 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3) |
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