05000461/FIN-2016001-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Operability Determination Failed to Examine Test Failures |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to follow Station Procedure OPAA108115, Operability Determinations, Revision 16. Specifically, after valve 1SX027C, a valve required for residual heat removal operability, failed a surveillance test, the licensee did not base the operability determination on a detailed examination of the deficiency and did not document a basis for why a reasonable expectation of operability existed. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as Action Request (AR) 02553168 and AR 02558101. The licensee revised the in-service testing program evaluation for valve 1SX027C and documented additional details to support declaring the valve operable. The inspectors determined the failure to follow Station Procedure OPAA108115 was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correctly perform an operability evaluation for valve 1SX027C had the potential to allow an inoperable condition to go undetected. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings AtPower, issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding: was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system; did not represent a loss of system and/or function; did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time; and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of resources, where leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, Station Procedure CPS 9053.04, provided guidance that the valve could remain operable for 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> without providing an appropriate basis. (H.1) |
| Site: | Clinton  |
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| Report | IR 05000461/2016001 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Phillips E Sanchez-Santiago I Khan J Wojewoda K Stoedter M Jones M Learn S Mischke V Meghani W Schaup |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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