05000454/FIN-2009004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Evaluation of Seismic Restraint on the FHB Crane Trolley |
| Description | A finding of very low safety-significance and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate evaluation of seismic restraint on the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) crane trolley. Specifically, for evaluation of the seismic restraint in their single failure proof trolley analysis, the licensee failed to use adequate seismic acceleration values and failed to evaluate the connections for resulting reaction forces. Subsequent review found that the restraint was inadequate. The licensee documented the condition in Issue Report (IR) 934467 and initiated actions for calculation revision and installation of a field modification. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform an adequate analysis for the seismic restraint and its connections for seismic loads was contrary to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1-2004, requirements and was a performance deficiency. The FHB crane is designed to Seismic Category I requirements and the licensee used compliance with ASME NOG-1-2004, as the design basis for their upgrade to a single failure proof crane. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, Refueling/Fuel Handling equipment, and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and based on a No answer to all the questions in the Initiating Events column of Table 4a, determined the finding to be of very low safety-significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices (H.4(c)) because the licensee did not provide adequate oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2009004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Pearson J Bozga R Skokowski M Learn E Love C Tilton G Morell R Ng C Thompson B Bartlett J Robbins J Cassidy M Mitchell J Neurauter D Jones S Bakhsh T Go V Meghani |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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