05000445/FIN-2011003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate External Flooding Instructions |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to have adequate external flooding instructions. The licensees technical requirements manual included circulating water system stop gates as a flood protection measure. This statement was not accurate for a reservoir level greater than 778 feet. As a result, the licensee failed to provide specific instructions for flood protection during circulating water system maintenance with stop gates in place. In addition, during service water travelling screen replacement, the licensee failed to provide adequate guidance to mitigate debris from entering the service water pump suctions if water level were to increase above 778 feet. As a result, the service water system was susceptible to fouling during a flooding event. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2011-004062. The licensees failure to have adequate external flooding instructions that resulted in safety related equipment being vulnerable to external flooding was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to involve equipment designed to mitigate an external flood and could result in a plant trip or affect more than one train of safety equipment and required a Phase 3 analysis. A senior reactor analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the calculated bounding delta core damage frequency was 1.9E-8. The finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with decision-making because the licensee failed to demonstrate that nuclear safety is an overriding priority when faced with unexpected plant conditions. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2011003 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Tindell D Proulx G Tutak J Kramer R Kopriva W Walker |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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