05000445/FIN-2011002-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Loss of Automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Upon Loss of Main Feedwater Technical Specification 3.3.2, Table 1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, Function 6.g, requires, in part, two operable channels of auxiliary feedwater actuation upon trip of all main feedwater pumps in Modes 1 and 2. With one channel inoperable, Technical Specification 3.3.2.J requires, in part, that the affected channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, on January 20, 2010, the licensee identified that at various times, the actuation logic function for auxiliary feedwater had been inoperable and that the licensee had failed to place the affected channel in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and was not in Mode 3 within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the actuation logic could not be made up with one main feedwater pump operating and the second main feedwater pump secured and reset. This condition occurred during unit startups and shutdowns. The non-cited violation was documented the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2010-000638. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue screened to a Phase 2 significance determination because it involved an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. A Phase 2 significance determination was performed using the pre-solved worksheet from the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. The inspectors noted that this feature was not credited in the plants safety analysis and the auxiliary feedwater safety function was still available. Therefore, using the Phase 2 worksheets, no change in the quantifiable risk was obtained and the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). |
Site: | Comanche Peak ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000445/2011002 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Stearns L Carson W Walker B Tindell J Kramer |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
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