On October 19, 2013 at approximately 0645 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Vogtle Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power. The main generator excitation system experienced a failure which tripped the Main Generator which subsequently tripped the Turbine and Reactor. The Reactor Trip System, the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System, and other responding equipment performed as expected. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3. The cause of the event was a failure of the Main Generator excitation system.
The safety significance of this event is very low. Unit 1 was not affected and there were no adverse effects of the health and safety of the public. |
A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT
This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as there was an unplanned automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW).
B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT
Mode 1 , 1 00% power
C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
While operating at 1 00% power with no abnormal indications, Unit 2 experienced a loss of generator excitation which tripped the Main Generator. This resulted in a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation due to a Turbine Trip above the P9 setpoint of 40% which shut down the reactor. The Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) actuated as Main Feedwater isolated when the RPS actuated. All rods inserted and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3 and no complications were experienced during the trip as all systems responded as designed.
D. CAUSE OF EVENT
The probable cause of the event was an intermittent fault in the Main Generator de-excitation control circuitry.
E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT
When the reactor tripped, all rods fully inserted. As a result of the reactor trip, the Feedwater System isolated and the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed. The unit was stabilized in Mode 3 at the applicable temperature and pressure. Because the plant responded as designed and there were no complications with the plant shutdown, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or the safety and health of the public.
F. CORRECTIVE ACTION
Following the failure of the de-excitation control circuitry of the EX21 00 generator excitation system, three controller cards and a breaker were replaced within the de-excitation system at the recommendation General Electric.
G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1) Failed Components:
2013 I - 02 - 00 General Electric EX-21 00 generator de-excitation control circuitry.
2) Previous Similar Events:
ICES 235585 Bruce 6 Turbine Trips Due to Loss of Excitation 3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:
[TL] - Main Generator Excitation System [JC]- Reactor Protection System [BA] - Auxiliary Feedwater System 4) Other Systems Affected:
None 5) Commitment Information:
This report does not create any commitments.
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05000443/LER-2013-001 | Failure to Enter Technical Specification Following Discovery of SW Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000251/LER-2013-001 | Power Operated Relief Valve Inoperable for Greater Than Allowed Outage Time Due to Lifted Leads | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000259/LER-2013-002 | Manual Reactor Shutdown Due to Decreasing Condenser Vacuum | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000397/LER-2013-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000482/LER-2013-002 | Pressure Boundary Leakage on a Seal Water Injection Drain Line due to Low Stress High Cycle Fatigue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000425/LER-2013-002 | Automatic Unit 2 Reactor Trip due loss of Generator Excitation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000251/LER-2013-002 | Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Offsite Power Resulting From Generator Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000353/LER-2013-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000247/LER-2013-004 | Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Essential Service Water (SW) Header as a Result of Pin Hole Leaks in Code Class 3 SW Piping | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000341/LER-2013-004 | Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications for 480 Volt Bus Inoperable Due to Failed Voltage Regulator | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000250/LER-2013-005 | Reactor Trip Due to Turbine Header Pressure Spike While Testing Turbine Control Valves | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000250/LER-2013-009 | Loose Breaker Control Power Fuse Holder Caused 3B ICW Pump to be Inoperable Longer than AOT | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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