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. June 15, 1990 W. G. Hairston, m J Senior W.o Premdent "
Nuclear Operatrans '-
ELV-01757--
0428
' Docket'No.
50-425 U. S.1 N0 clear Regulatory Commission ATTN: ' Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555 Gentlemen:
V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT MISLEADING TASK SHEET LEADS TO INADEQUATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICl) TION SURVEILLANCES In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed rev_ised report related to an event discovered on February 28,L1990.
'This revision is necessary to update the status of some of the corrective actions discussed in the original report.
~'
Sincerely, [A)
W. G.
airston, III l
c
- - WGH,III/NJS/gm-
Enclosure:
LER 50-425/1990-001, Revision 1 xc: Georaia Power Company Mr. C. K. McCoy L
Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
~Mrs R. M. Odom Mr. P.tD.. Rushton NORMS'
'U.
S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission 1 Mr. S. D..Ebneter,.. Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR l
Mr. '8. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle l'
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V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2 o,s ; o io ; o ;4 l 2 5 1 lo;l014 TITLt tel MISLEADING TASK SHEET LEADS TO INADEQUATE TECHNICAL SPECFICIATION SURVEILLANCES EVENT DATE 151 LE R Nuu.tR tel REPORT DATE 171 OTHE R F ACILITIE S INVOLVED ISI MONTH DAY YEAR Yt&H l',,, 4,A b
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TH,5 ftEPORT is su.MITTED PUR$UANT TO THE RE QuiREMENT8 Of 10 CFR l ICAera one e, we e,ne toneempt 111) r OPE R ATING MODE W 1
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRigED IN THl4 fitPORT 113) ntponiA I AC REPORTA E
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On 1-3-90, a surveillance to verify containment integrity was completed and revieweo.
The surveillance verified that valves 21204U4293 and 21204U4324 were closed and secured.
Subsequently, on 2-1-90, the surveillance was repeated and valves 21204U4293 and 21204U4324 were again verified to be closed and secured.
On 2-28-90, the surveillance was again performed. During the review by the Shift Supervisor (SS), he noted that for the previous month's surveillance, only 2 of the 41-valves and flanges listed in the associated procedure were addressed. He initiated an investigation which determined that all 41 line items should have been verified on 1-3-90 and 2-1-90 as required by Technical Specif_ication-(TS) 4.6.1.1.a.
This_ specification requires that containment penetrations which are not closed by automatic isolation valves be verified closed and secured at least once per 31 days.
Therefore, the surveillances performed on 1-3-90 and 2-1-90 failed to meet the requirements of TS 4.6.1.1.a.
The principal reason for the missed surveillances was the format of the Surveillance Task Sheets (STS's) which resulted in cognitive personnel errors on behalf of the personnel involved since they were led to believe that only two valves were required to be surveilled. The STS's associated with valves 21204U4293 and 21204U4324 have been revised to delete these valve numbers and direct personnel to see the appropriate procedure. A review to identify and correct similar problems with other STS's is scheduled to be completed by 7-31-90.
N4P. x.
FORRIWGA.
U.S. NUCLE AA LE AULATOAV COtehel8 BION i
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER).
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PNUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated in violation of Technical Specification (TS) requirements for surveillance testing.
B.
UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS 4
At the timo-of the events on 1-3-90 and on 2-1-90, Unit 2 was operating in Mode _1: at 100% rated thermal power.
There was no inoperable equipment which l'
contributed to the occurrence of these events.
C.. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS.
On 1-3-90,'a surveillance to verify containment integrity was completed and l'
- reviewed, The surveillance verified that valves 21204U4293 and 21204U4324 were. closed and secured.
Subsequently, on-2-1-90, the surveillance was repeated-and again verified that valves 21204U4293 and 21204U4324 were L
closed and secured. At this time, the Shift Supervisor (SS) noted on the Surveillance Task Sheet (STS) that the surveillance was " performed satisfactory" for the two vaives listed.
On 2-28-90, the surveillance was again performed.
During the review by the SS, he noted that, for the previous month's surveillance, only 2 of the 41 valves and flanges listed in procedure 14475-2, " Containment Integrity l
Verification - Valves Outside Containment,"' were addressed.
He initiated an-l-
investigation which determined that all 41 line items should have been verified on 1-3-90 and 2-1-90 as required by Technical Specification Section 4.6.1.1.a which states:
" Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 J
days by verifying that all penetrations not capable of being closed by l
.0PERABLE containment automatic' isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by-valves, blind. flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their~ positions,...".
l
- - Therefore, the surveillance performed on 1-3-90 and 2-1-90 failed to meet
. the. requirements of 'TS 4.6.1.1.a.
'The review by the SS found that while the STS referenced procedure 14475-2 for use in task completion, it listed only the two aforementioned valves due i
to space. constraints.
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CAUSES OF EVENT The principal reason for the missed surveillances was the format of the STS which led the personnel involved to believe that only two valves were required to be surveilled.
The root cause for this formatting error.was an-inadequate technical review of a revision to the STS.
A contributing cause was cognitive personnel error on the part of the SS's g
f reviewing the surveillance results on 1-3-90 and 2-1-90.
They failed to adequately review the scope of the surveillonce.to ensure compliance with Technical Specification requirements. The personnel ir.volved believed that the STS's, which listed only two valves, limited the scope of the surveillance to those two valves. This error _was not the result of any-unusual characteristics of-the work location, e
O E.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
L4 The valves in question were verified to be' locked closed when inspected on 2-28-90. A review of Maintenance Work Orders and the Locked-Valve Log 1
determined that none of the flanges in question were removed nor were the "i
valves in question manipulated.
Finally, during -the period of time L
involved, there was no event which challenged containment integrity.
Based on.these considerations, these events had no adverse impact on plant safety-or.the health and safety of the public.
F.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
l l.
The valves in question were verified to be locked closed when inspected I
on 2-28-90, t
2.
The STS's associated with valves 21204U4293 and 21204U4324 have been revised to delete these valve numbers and direct personnel to see procedure 14475-2, where all 41 valves and ' flanges are listed. A review I'
to identify and correct similar problems with.other STS's' was initiated.
The scope of the review was larger than anticipated.
This review and corrective actions will be completed by 7-31-90.
3.
The personnel involved have been counseled regarding the importance of attention to' detail in review of surveillance procedures.
- - 4.
Licensed operator requalification training will be amended by 6-30-90 to include this report.
- - 5.
Administrative controls for technical reviews of revisions to STS's have been strengthened.
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In the interim, until_ all corrective actions have been completed, direction has been given via'a nicht order to the Unit SS's to review the scope of STS's to ensure compliance with Technical Specification requirements.
1
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
l.
Failed Components:
Le None.
2.
Previous Similar Events
LER 50-425/1989-026, dated 10-2-89.
LER 50-424/1988-012, dated 5-12-88.
3 f
The corrective actions for these LERs' addressed partially completed surveillances but the cause of the events was different than that of the events on 1-3-90 and 2-1-90.
1 3.-
Energy Industry Identification System Code:
E,
' Containment Isolation System - JM wx e,
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NIC Pam 308A (689)
|
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000424/LER-1990-001-02, :on 900124,reactor Tripped When MSIV Failed to Reopen Automatically at 10% Closed Position,As Designed & Indicator Illuminated & Position Indication Lost.Caused by Failed Fuses.Fuses Replaced & Switch Adjusted |
- on 900124,reactor Tripped When MSIV Failed to Reopen Automatically at 10% Closed Position,As Designed & Indicator Illuminated & Position Indication Lost.Caused by Failed Fuses.Fuses Replaced & Switch Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000425/LER-1990-001-03, :Surveillances Performed on 900103 & 0201 Failed to Meet Requirements of Tech Specs 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Personnel Misled to Believe That Only 2 of 41 Items Verified.Sts Revised |
- Surveillances Performed on 900103 & 0201 Failed to Meet Requirements of Tech Specs 4.6.1.1.a.Caused by Personnel Misled to Believe That Only 2 of 41 Items Verified.Sts Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000425/LER-1990-001, :on 900103,misleading Task Sheet Leads to Inadequate Tech Spec Surveillances Found.Caused by Deficient Technical Review of Rev to Sts.Personnel Involved Counseled Re Importance of Reviewing Procedure Carefully |
- on 900103,misleading Task Sheet Leads to Inadequate Tech Spec Surveillances Found.Caused by Deficient Technical Review of Rev to Sts.Personnel Involved Counseled Re Importance of Reviewing Procedure Carefully
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000424/LER-1990-002-02, :on 900215,discovered That Train C Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Actuation Relay K266 Improperly Tested.On 900216,discovered That Automatic Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Not Tested.Testing Performed |
- on 900215,discovered That Train C Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Actuation Relay K266 Improperly Tested.On 900216,discovered That Automatic Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Not Tested.Testing Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000425/LER-1990-002-03, :on 900320,generator Primary Differential Relay Energized,Causing Generator,Turbine & Reactor Trips & Fault Which Tripped Reserve Auxiliary Transformers a & B.Caused by Incorrect Tap Settings.Settings Corrected |
- on 900320,generator Primary Differential Relay Energized,Causing Generator,Turbine & Reactor Trips & Fault Which Tripped Reserve Auxiliary Transformers a & B.Caused by Incorrect Tap Settings.Settings Corrected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000424/LER-1990-003-01, :on 900223,discovered 16 Transformer Core Clamp Bolts Missing on Seismically Qualified Switchgear. Caused by Installation Error During Const Phase of Plant. Missing Clamps Replaced |
- on 900223,discovered 16 Transformer Core Clamp Bolts Missing on Seismically Qualified Switchgear. Caused by Installation Error During Const Phase of Plant. Missing Clamps Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-003, S-01:on 900425,engineering Supervisor Observed Unsecured & Unattended Safeguards Cabinet in Engineering Support Dept Ofc Area.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error. Engineer Counseled | S-01:on 900425,engineering Supervisor Observed Unsecured & Unattended Safeguards Cabinet in Engineering Support Dept Ofc Area.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error. Engineer Counseled | | | 05000424/LER-1990-004-01, :on 900301,failure to Comply W/Tech Spec 3.0.4 Occurred on Entry Into Mode 6.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Util Complied W/Action Requirements for Tech Spec 3.9.2 |
- on 900301,failure to Comply W/Tech Spec 3.0.4 Occurred on Entry Into Mode 6.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Util Complied W/Action Requirements for Tech Spec 3.9.2
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000425/LER-1990-004-02, :on 900411,power Range Calorimetric Channel Calibr Not Performed.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error. Unit Shift Supervisor Counseled Re Importance of Complying W/Tech Specs |
- on 900411,power Range Calorimetric Channel Calibr Not Performed.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error. Unit Shift Supervisor Counseled Re Importance of Complying W/Tech Specs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-005, :on 900314,observed That Indicator Lights for Actuation Handswitches for Trains a & B of Fuel Handling Bldg Showed Actuation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. Operator Counseled |
- on 900314,observed That Indicator Lights for Actuation Handswitches for Trains a & B of Fuel Handling Bldg Showed Actuation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. Operator Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000425/LER-1990-005-02, :on 900427 & 29,computer Point FO-424A Discovered to Be Reading Lower than Control Board Indications.Caused by Intermittent Failure of Computer. Computer Input Card Replaced |
- on 900427 & 29,computer Point FO-424A Discovered to Be Reading Lower than Control Board Indications.Caused by Intermittent Failure of Computer. Computer Input Card Replaced
| | | 05000425/LER-1990-006-01, :on 900501,data Processing Module Was Taken to Purge Which Rendered Both Monitors 2RE-2562C & 2RE-2562A Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Memo Issued to Chemistry Dept Personnel Re Appropriate Action |
- on 900501,data Processing Module Was Taken to Purge Which Rendered Both Monitors 2RE-2562C & 2RE-2562A Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Memo Issued to Chemistry Dept Personnel Re Appropriate Action
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-007, S-00:on 900829,safeguards Info Container Observed Unsecured & Unattended in Document File Room.Caused by Safeguards Info Coordinator Failure to Secure Container Before Going to Lunch.Coordinator Counseled & Reprimanded | S-00:on 900829,safeguards Info Container Observed Unsecured & Unattended in Document File Room.Caused by Safeguards Info Coordinator Failure to Secure Container Before Going to Lunch.Coordinator Counseled & Reprimanded | | | 05000425/LER-1990-007-02, :on 900506,control Room Operators Received Trouble Alarms Indicating Closure of MSIV 2HV-30264 & Steam Generator 3 Low Level Water Level.Caused by Relay Failure. Failed Relay Replaced & MSIV Tested |
- on 900506,control Room Operators Received Trouble Alarms Indicating Closure of MSIV 2HV-30264 & Steam Generator 3 Low Level Water Level.Caused by Relay Failure. Failed Relay Replaced & MSIV Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000425/LER-1990-008-02, :on 900628,indication Received in Control Room That MSIV 2HV-3026A Was Closing.Caused by Failure of O-ring Which Seals Connection of Nonpump Side Manifold Assembly to Boss on Actuator cylinder.O-ring Replaced |
- on 900628,indication Received in Control Room That MSIV 2HV-3026A Was Closing.Caused by Failure of O-ring Which Seals Connection of Nonpump Side Manifold Assembly to Boss on Actuator cylinder.O-ring Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000424/LER-1990-008, S-00:on 901011,eleven Documents Found Unattended & Unsecured in Folder on Desk Being Moved.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Safeguards Documents Returned to Their Approved Storage Container | S-00:on 901011,eleven Documents Found Unattended & Unsecured in Folder on Desk Being Moved.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Safeguards Documents Returned to Their Approved Storage Container | 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)(v) | | 05000425/LER-1990-009-02, :on 900630,manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to Delays in Synchronization to Grid.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error by Shift Superintendent.Personnel Counseled & Operating Procedure Revised |
- on 900630,manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to Delays in Synchronization to Grid.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error by Shift Superintendent.Personnel Counseled & Operating Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000424/LER-1990-009, :on 900413,inadvertent Feedwater Isolation Occurred.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Revised to Have Input Error Inhibit Switch Placed in Normal First & Reinstate Block on Feedwater Isolation Signal |
- on 900413,inadvertent Feedwater Isolation Occurred.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Revised to Have Input Error Inhibit Switch Placed in Normal First & Reinstate Block on Feedwater Isolation Signal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000425/LER-1990-010-02, :on 900702,observed That Unit 2 Process & Effluent Radiation Monitoring Sys Computer Screen Displayed Active Limiting Condition for Operation Against 2RE-2562C. Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled |
- on 900702,observed That Unit 2 Process & Effluent Radiation Monitoring Sys Computer Screen Displayed Active Limiting Condition for Operation Against 2RE-2562C. Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000424/LER-1990-010, :on 900418,oncoming Shift Supervisor Found That Containment Level C Temp Improperly Recorded.Caused by Data Being Recorded & Reviewed from Malfunctioning Indication.Individuals Counseled |
- on 900418,oncoming Shift Supervisor Found That Containment Level C Temp Improperly Recorded.Caused by Data Being Recorded & Reviewed from Malfunctioning Indication.Individuals Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000425/LER-1990-011-02, :on 900830,containment Ventilation Isolation Occurred.Caused by Failure of Random Access Memory (RAM) Circuit Board in Data Processing Module.Failed RAM Board Replaced & Returned to Vendor for Analysis |
- on 900830,containment Ventilation Isolation Occurred.Caused by Failure of Random Access Memory (RAM) Circuit Board in Data Processing Module.Failed RAM Board Replaced & Returned to Vendor for Analysis
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000424/LER-1990-011, :on 900425,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Main Feed Regulating Valve.Caused by Mispositioning of Local Control Levers.Local Control Levers Removed |
- on 900425,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Inadvertent Closure of Main Feed Regulating Valve.Caused by Mispositioning of Local Control Levers.Local Control Levers Removed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000424/LER-1990-012, :on 900529,discovered That Sequencer Delay Times Not Taken Into Account During Summation Procedure for Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Review.Procedures Changed |
- on 900529,discovered That Sequencer Delay Times Not Taken Into Account During Summation Procedure for Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Review.Procedures Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000425/LER-1990-012-02, :on 900916,shift Supervisor Inadvertently Issued Mode 5 Clearance to Remove Train a & B Containment Spray Sys Pumps from Svc for Maint |
- on 900916,shift Supervisor Inadvertently Issued Mode 5 Clearance to Remove Train a & B Containment Spray Sys Pumps from Svc for Maint
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000425/LER-1990-013-02, :on 900926,removing Power to Plant Vent Monitor Led to Tech Spec Violation |
- on 900926,removing Power to Plant Vent Monitor Led to Tech Spec Violation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000424/LER-1990-013, :on 900601,discovered That Containment Air Lock Leakage Surveillance Exceeded 6-month Test Interval,Per Tech Spec 4.6.1.3.b.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Surveillance Tracking Program Revised |
- on 900601,discovered That Containment Air Lock Leakage Surveillance Exceeded 6-month Test Interval,Per Tech Spec 4.6.1.3.b.Caused by Personnel Error.Plant Surveillance Tracking Program Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000425/LER-1990-014-02, :on 900927 & 1001,unmonitored Liquid Release Occurred Due to Failure to Restore Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line Radiation Monitor 2RE-0021 to Svc After Being Isolated & Valved Out |
- on 900927 & 1001,unmonitored Liquid Release Occurred Due to Failure to Restore Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line Radiation Monitor 2RE-0021 to Svc After Being Isolated & Valved Out
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-015, :on 900712,calibr Requirements Not Applied to Computer Points Used for Obtaining Final Feedwater Temp Input Valves.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Precision Heat Balance Procedure to Be Revised |
- on 900712,calibr Requirements Not Applied to Computer Points Used for Obtaining Final Feedwater Temp Input Valves.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Precision Heat Balance Procedure to Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000425/LER-1990-015-02, :on 901026,missed Procedure Step Results in Inadvertent Operation of ESF Components |
- on 901026,missed Procedure Step Results in Inadvertent Operation of ESF Components
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(1) | | 05000425/LER-1990-016-02, :on 901108,personnel Error Led to Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Actuation |
- on 901108,personnel Error Led to Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Actuation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000424/LER-1990-016, :on 900723,determined That Failed 4,160/480- Volt non-1E Transformer Led to Main Feed Pump Trip & Reactor Trip.Caused by Internal Fault in 1NB01 Transformer.Failed Transformer Replaced |
- on 900723,determined That Failed 4,160/480- Volt non-1E Transformer Led to Main Feed Pump Trip & Reactor Trip.Caused by Internal Fault in 1NB01 Transformer.Failed Transformer Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000425/LER-1990-017-02, :on 901110,LCO 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Step Demand Counters for Control Bank D |
- on 901110,LCO 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperable Step Demand Counters for Control Bank D
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-017, :on 900305,sys Engineer Found That Certain Electrical Circuits Not Identified for Testing During Performance of Procedure.Caused by Inadequate ESFAS Test Procedure.Procedure 00404-C Revised |
- on 900305,sys Engineer Found That Certain Electrical Circuits Not Identified for Testing During Performance of Procedure.Caused by Inadequate ESFAS Test Procedure.Procedure 00404-C Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000424/LER-1990-018-01, :on 900907,discovered That Surveillance Required by Tech Spec 4.0.5 & ASME Section XI Inadequately Performed.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Procedure Corrected & Operability of Check Valve Reverified |
- on 900907,discovered That Surveillance Required by Tech Spec 4.0.5 & ASME Section XI Inadequately Performed.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Procedure Corrected & Operability of Check Valve Reverified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000424/LER-1990-019-01, :900314,engineer Discovered Condition Which Would Allow Inservice Insps of Containment Isolation Valves to Be Performed Following Completion of ASME Section XI Local Leak Rate Testing |
- 900314,engineer Discovered Condition Which Would Allow Inservice Insps of Containment Isolation Valves to Be Performed Following Completion of ASME Section XI Local Leak Rate Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-020-01, :on 900808,personnel Error Led to Tech Spec Violation |
- on 900808,personnel Error Led to Tech Spec Violation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-021-01, :Between 901202-03,special Condition Surveillance Not Performed When Rod Position Deviation Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Future Training on Proteus Computer Planned |
- Between 901202-03,special Condition Surveillance Not Performed When Rod Position Deviation Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Future Training on Proteus Computer Planned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(iv) | | 05000424/LER-1990-021, :on 901202,special Condition Surveillance Not Performed When Rod Position Deviation Monitor Inoperable. Caused Personnel Error.Personnel Under Went Positive Discipline Re Compliance W/Procedures |
- on 901202,special Condition Surveillance Not Performed When Rod Position Deviation Monitor Inoperable. Caused Personnel Error.Personnel Under Went Positive Discipline Re Compliance W/Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000424/LER-1990-022-01, :on 901212,auditor Found Possible Discrepancy in Calculation for Determining Filter Unit Electrical Heater Power Dissipation.Caused by Architect/Engineer.Request for Tech Spec Change Submitted |
- on 901212,auditor Found Possible Discrepancy in Calculation for Determining Filter Unit Electrical Heater Power Dissipation.Caused by Architect/Engineer.Request for Tech Spec Change Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(h)(2) | | 05000424/LER-1990-023-01, :on 901218,4160/480 Volt non-1E Transformer Experienced Internal Fault.Cause Indeterminate.Failed Transformer Replaced & Further Study of Possible Factors Which May Have Led to Failure in Progress |
- on 901218,4160/480 Volt non-1E Transformer Experienced Internal Fault.Cause Indeterminate.Failed Transformer Replaced & Further Study of Possible Factors Which May Have Led to Failure in Progress
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000424/LER-1990-024-01, :on 900807,Unit 2 Containment Isolation Valves Associated W/Train a Closed & Unit 1 Valves Opened for Testing.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedures Revised & Procedure Coordinator Informed |
- on 900807,Unit 2 Containment Isolation Valves Associated W/Train a Closed & Unit 1 Valves Opened for Testing.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedures Revised & Procedure Coordinator Informed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
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