05000416/LER-2019-003-01, Secondary Containment Personnel Door Failure
| ML20064F750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/2020 |
| From: | Emily Larson Entergy Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GNRO-2020/00005 LER 2019-003-01 | |
| Download: ML20064F750 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
| 4162019003R01 - NRC Website | |
text
~ Entergy GNRO-2020/00005 March 4, 2020 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Eric A. Larson Site Vice President Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Tel: 601-437-7500 10 CFR 50.73
SUBJECT:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Revised Licensee Event Report 2019-003-01, Secondary Containment Personnel Door Failure N RC Docket No. 50-416 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 Attached is a revised Licensee Event Report 2019-003-01, Secondary Containment Personnel Door Failure. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) for an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
This letter contains no new commitments. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Jim Shaw at 601-437-2103.
Sincerely, Eric A. Larson EAL/fas
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report 2019-003-01
GNRO-2020/00005 Page 2 of 2 cc:
NRC Region IV - Regional Administrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRR Project Manager
GN RO-2020/00005 Attachment Licensee Event Report 2019-003-01
NRC FORM366 (04-2018)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020
- 1. Facility Name LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/}
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1
- 4. Title
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LER Number
- 7. Report Date Month Day Year 08 05 2019 Year 2019 Sequential Number
- - 003 Rev No.
Month Day Year
- - 01 03 04 2020
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not reauired to respond to the information collection.
- 2. Docket Number
- 13. Page 05000 416 1 OF 3
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Facility Name Docket Number N/A 05000 N/A Facility Name Docket Number N/A 05000 N/A
- 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Reoort is Submitted Pursuant to the Requiremen1s of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71 (a)(5) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 181 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73. 77(a)(2)(ii)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in =
Plant Conditions
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Unit 1 was operating at approximately 100 percent power in MODE 1. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable that contributed to the event.
Description
On August 5, 2019, at 09:36, the Control Room was notified that the Secondary Containment Door (NF) 1T101A401 B (or 1A401 B) was found with door hinges broken and the door was unable to be closed.
With the Secondary Containment Door unsecured, Secondary Containment was declared INOPERABLE and Secondary Containment Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1 was not met. TS LCO 3.6.4.1 was met on August 5, 2019 at 13:36 and Secondary Containment was declared operable.
Door 1 A401 B is a security door, and the on-shift Security Force initiated compensatory measures immediately. Therefore, the Security Plan was not affected.
Door 1 A401 B is a fire barrier. Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 6.2.8 Condition A was not met. Operations declared the door NON-FUNCTIONAL and established an hourly fire watch per TRM 6.2.8 Action A.2.2.
TS LCO 3.6.4.1, and TRM 6.2.8 function were met when maintenance technicians replaced the broken hinges for the door and the door was declared operable on August 5, 2019, at 13:36.
Reportability
This event was reported as an event or condition that, at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material per 1 O CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The event notification is EN 54201.
This event is also reportable per 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).
Direct Cause:
Based on vendor's engineering analysis, the Direct Cause was Door 1T101 A401 B hinge pins failed due to brittle fracture, resulting in a loss of the Secondary Containment Safety Function.
Root Cause:
The Root Cause for this event is the unique design of the hinges, which introduces a side-loaded stress on the hinge pins while the door is open. The hinges on the Door 1 A401 B are surface-mounted cam-lift hinges that are designed to be installed in a full-mortised configuration.
Immediate Corrective Actions
Security Force members initiated compensatory measures immediately while Door 1 A401 B was unable to perform its security barrier function, satisfying the Security Plan requirements. Page 2 of 3 I
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nureqs/staff/sr1022/r31)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LEA NUMBER YEAR Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000-416 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
2019
- - 003
- - 01 Operators and Security Force members were also serving as an hourly fire watch while Door 1 A401 B was unable to perform its fire barrier function, satisfying TRM 6.2.8 Action A2.2.2.
Work was performed to replace all of the hinges restoring Door 1 A401 B to its design configuration.
Planned Corrective Actions to Preclude Recurrence, which may be modified per the Entergy corrective action program:
The Corrective Actions for this event will be implementing a modification to install a more robust hinge design in Door 1A401 B.
Safety Significance
There were no actual consequences for this event. There was no radiological release from the Secondary Containment as a result of this event. There were no other actual consequences to safety of the general public, nuclear safety, industrial safety and radiological safety.
Previous Similar Event:
A three-year review of similar events was conducted.
On July 9, 2017, a pressure boundary door to the Control Room Envelope was left unsecured for approximately one minute. The Control Room Envelope was declared inoperable, due to the open boundary door. The direct cause of the event was that the door was degraded, resulting in the door dragging on the floor such that the automatic door closure device would not function properly.
The event was reported as a Loss of Safety Function per 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2){v)(D).
LER 05-416/2017-005-00.
The Corrective Actions from this event implemented a maintenance strategy, which did not include the Secondary Containment Door that is the subject of this LER.
GGNS has planned corrective actions to address the maintenance strategy associated with the Secondary Containment Doors. Page 3 of 3