An NRC identified non-cited violation (
NCV) of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions to replace a frequently operated sliding link associated with the 2A train
auxiliary feedwater (CA) control circuitry. As a result, the sliding link failed prior to replacement which affected the function to automatically swap from the normal source to the assured source (nuclear
service water) on low suction pressure to the 2A motor driven CA pump. The licensee replaced the failed sliding link and entered the issue into their corrective action program. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to promptly implement corrective actions for a previously identified vulnerability with frequently operated sliding link E-12 was a performance deficiency (
PD). The
PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the
mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed sliding link resulted in the inoperability of the 2A train of CA. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the multiple sources of water available to the CA pump before the assured source was needed, and the short duration that the
steam generator injection lines valves were closed. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resolution (P.3), as described in the problem identification and resolution cross-cutting area as the licensee failed to replace sliding link E-12 in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance.
