05000413/FIN-2016004-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Lockout Relay Testing Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing Green non cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086, 2ETA 4160V Switchgear Lockout Relays, during relay testing, resulting in inadvertently tripping the A control room area chilled water system (CRACWS) compressor. Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in tripping the A CRACWS compressor and entering TS 3.7.11, Control Room Area Chilled Water System (CRACWS). As corrective actions, the licensee started the B CRACWS chiller, completed the testing on the A CRACWS chiller and returned it to operable. The licensee entered this issue as condition report (CR) 2062216. The inspectors determined the failure to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure adherence attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the A train of CRACWS. Using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 screening worksheet of the SDP, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not result in a loss of safety system function for a single train for greater than TS allowed outage time, did not result in a loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the area of human performance because the licensee failed to follow procedure IP/2/A/4971/086 during lockout relay testing. (H.8) |
| Site: | Catawba  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000413/2016004 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Scott F Ehrhardt J Austin M Meeks |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2016004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Catawba) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Catawba)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||