05000390/LER-2011-001, For Watts Bar Regarding Safety Injection Pump Capable of Injecting Into Reactor Coolant System in Mode 5
| ML111610072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/2011 |
| From: | Grissette D Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 11-001-00 | |
| Download: ML111610072 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3902011001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381 June 8, 2011 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN:
Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 390/2011 -001, Safety Injection Pump Capable of Injecting into Reactor Coolant System in Mode 5 This submittal provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 390/2011-001.
This LER documents an instance where Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.12 was not met because a Safety Injection Pump was capable of injecting to the RCS in MODE 5.
The condition is reported as an LER for a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
This report is submitted in 30 days in accordance with Watts Bar License Condition 2.G.
TVA continues to evaluate this event, and will provide a supplemental report by July 8, 2011 to address the incomplete information.
There are no regulatory commitments in this letter.
Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Chris Riedl, Site Licensing Manager at (423) 365-1742.
Respectfully, D. E. Grissette Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Enclosure cc:
See Page 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 8, 2011 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
- 1. FACILITY NAME Watts Bar Nuclear Plant APPROVED BY OMB:
NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52),
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or
- sponsor, and a
person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000390
- 3. PAGE 1
OF 4
- 4. TITLE Safety Injection Pump Capable of Injecting into Reactor Coolant System in Mode 5
- 5. EVENT DATE MONTH 05 DAY 09 YEAR 2011
- 9. OPERATING MODE 5
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0%
- 6. LER NUMBER YEAR 2011 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
0
- 7. REPORT DATE MONTH 06 DAY 8
YEAR 2011
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME N/A FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET NUMBER N/A DOCKET NUMBER N/A
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§:
(Check all that a n
20.2201 (b) n 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 20.2201 (d) n 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
H 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii) n 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
50.73(a)(2)(ix)(
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 3 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
50.36(c)(2)
50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
73.71 (a)(4)
H 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
73.71 (a)(5)
20.2203(a)(2)(v)
50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D OTHER n
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstrac or in NRC Form 3 ppiy)
(A)
(B)
A)
- t below
.66A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME Chris Riedl, Site Licensing Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
(423)365-1742CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU FACTURER REPORTABLE III pA,jqF TO EPIX I
CAUSE
I
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED H YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
D NO SYSTEM COMPONENT
- 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE MANU FACTURER MONTH 07 REPORTABLE TO EPIX DAY 08 YEAR 2011 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On May 9, 2011 at 15:18 Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), during the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN) cycle 10 refueling outage, TVA started Safety Injection Pump (SIP) 1A to fill Cold Leg Accumulator 1 in accordance with Safety Injection System Operating Instruction, SOI-63.01 section 8.1.1.
Upon starting the SIP the operator noticed an abnormal RCS pressure rise. WBN entered LCO 3.4.12 Condition A to immediately verify no SIPs are capable of injecting into the RCS.
The operator immediately secured the SIP at the MCR hand switch, and RCS pressure immediately began to decrease.
Maximum RCS pressure read on the digital readout as monitored by the solid plant operator was 328 psig.
Because of the operator's quick action the SIP was secured before the pressure could reach Cold Overpressure Mitigation System relief valve setpoints, so there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.
The breakers for the SIPs were racked down to ensure no inadvertent operation of the SIP until the system alignment was verified correct.
The SIP 1A Cold Leg Injection flow control valve was found to be open when it should have been closed.
System alignment was restored.
Event analysis and cause evaluation are underway. The plant is not expected to be in a MODE where this requirement is applicable before analysis is complete.
A supplemental report will be provided by July 8, 2011.
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)(10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 05000390 2011 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV No.
2 OF 4 I.
PLANT CONDITIONS
Plant in Mode 5 at 0% RCS Solid Plant Operations II.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
A.
Event On May 9, 2011 at 15:18 Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), during the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1
(WBN) cycle 10 refueling outage, TVA started Safety Injection Pump (SIP) 1A to fill Cold Leg Accumulator 1 in accordance with Safety Injection System Operating Instruction, SOI-63.01 section 8.1.1.
Upon starting the SIP the operator noticed an abnormal Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure rise. WBN entered LCO 3.4.12 Condition A to immediately verify no SIPs are capable of injecting into the RCS.
The operator immediately secured the SIP at the MCR hand switch, and RCS pressure immediately began to decrease.
Maximum RCS pressure read on the digital readout as monitored by the solid plant operator was 328 psig.
Because of the operator's quick action the SIP was secured before the pressure could reach Cold Overpressure Mitigation System relief valve setpoints, so there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.
The breakers for the SIPs were racked down to ensure no inadvertent operation of the SIP until the system alignment was verified correct.
The SIP 1A Cold Leg Injection flow control valve was found to be open when it should have been closed.
System alignment was restored.
Event analysis and cause evaluation are underway. The plant is not expected to be in a MODE where this requirement is applicable before analysis is complete.
A supplemental report will be provided by July 8, 2011.
B.
Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event.
No inoperable structures, systems, or components contributed to the event.
C.
Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences
Date 5/9/2011 5/9/2011 5/9/2011 5/9/2011 Time (EDT) 15:18 15:18 15:18 16:12 Event 5/9/2011 16:35 Started 1A SIP to fill CLA's per SOI 63.01, section 8.1.1.
1A SIP secured due to an indicated rise in RCS pressure.
Max RCS pressure on ICS was noted to be 328 psig (digital readout).
Unit Supervisor directed securing 1A SIP. RCS pressure immediately decreased when 1A SIP was placed in stop-pull to lock.
Entered TS LCO 3.4.12, condition A, which requires initiating action to verify no safety injection pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS immediately, in response to RCS pressure rising after 1A SIP start.
Breakers BKR-63-10, 1-BKR-63-15, & 1-BKR-62-108 verified racked to seismic.
Performed Temporary Lift on associated breakers to validate positions of Cold Leg Injection Flow Control Valves 1-FCV-63-152 & 1-FCV-63-156. 1-FCV-63-152, SIP 1A-A Cold Leg Injection Flow Control Valve, was found open. Closed 1-FCV-63-152 under SM/US direction to restore breaker to required configuration.
1 -FCV-63-156 was found closed.
Restored temp lift to remove power from 1-FCV-63-152 & 1-FCV-63-156 with valves in required COMS configuration.
1-BKR-63-10, SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-63-10), racked back to CONNECT with springs charged to return component to desired configuration.(10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 05000390 2011 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV No.
3 OF 4 II.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (continued):
D.
Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected
No other system or secondary functions were affected by this event.
E.
Method of Discovery
Operator observation of RCS pressure rise when SIP was started.
F.
Operator Actions
1.
Secured 1A SIP 2.
Racked down breakers to prevent inadvertent start of SIP 3.
Identified misaligned Cold Leg Injection Flow Control Valve and closed it 4.
Restored breakers and SIPs to normal alignment G.
Safety System Responses None initiated as none were required.
III.
CAUSE OF EVENT
Cause of the event will be addressed in our supplemental report, pending completion of the causal analysis.
The condition was immediately corrected, and the unit is not planned to be in an applicable mode before the cause evaluation is complete and recurrence measures in place.
IV.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
Analysis of the event is still under development and will be addressed in our supplemental report.
The condition was immediately corrected, and the unit is not planned to be in an applicable mode before the cause evaluation is complete and recurrence measures in place.
V.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
Because of the prompt operator response, the pressure never reached the relief valve setpoints or any overpressure limits, so there were no safety consequences from this event.(10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 05000390 2011 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV No.
4 OF 4 VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
This event was documented within TVA's Corrective Action Program as PER 366905.
A.
Immediate Corrective Actions
1.
Secured 1A SIP 2.
Racked down breakers to prevent inadvertent start of SIP 3.
Identified misaligned Cold Leg Injection Flow Control Valve and closed it 4.
Restored breakers and SIPs to normal alignment B.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence 1.
Corrective actions to prevent recurrence are still under development and will be addressed in our final report.
The condition was immediately corrected, and the unit is not planned to be in an applicable mode before the cause evaluation is complete and recurrence measures in place.
VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A.
Failed Components None identified at this time.
This will be confirmed in the supplemental report.
B.
Previous LERs on Similar Events This search will be completed as part of the event analysis which will be addressed in the supplemental report.
C.
Additional Information
None at this time.
D.
Safety System Functional Failure This event did not involve a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI 99-02, Revision 5.
E.
Loss of Normal Heat Removal Consideration None identified at this time.
This will be confirmed in the supplemental report.
VIII.COMMITMENTS None.