05000389/LER-2021-002, Foreign Material Exclusion Device Found in Containment Spray System
| ML21314A023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/2021 |
| From: | Deboer D Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-2021-204 LER 2021-002-00 | |
| Download: ML21314A023 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) |
| 3892021002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
November 10, 2021 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Re:
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Reportable Event: 2021-002-00 Date of Event: September 16, 2021 L-2021 -204 10 CFR 50.73 Foreign Material Exclusion Device Found in Containment Spray System The attached Licensee Event Report 2021-002 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50. 73 to provide notification of the subject event.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Richard Sciscente at (772) 467-7156.
Sincerely, Daniel DeBoer Site Vice President St. Lucie Plant DD/res Attachment cc:
St. Lucie NRC Senior Resident Inspector St. Lucie NRC Program Manager Florida Power & Light Company 6501 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (08-2020)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2023 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
- 1. Facility Name St. Lucie Unit 2
- 2. Docket Number 05000389
- 3. Page 1 of 3
- 4. Title Foreign Material Exclusion Device Found in Containment Spray System
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LER Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Month Day Year Year Sequential Number Revision Number Month Day Year Facility Name Docket Number 09 16 2021 2021 -
002 - 00 11 10 2021 Facility Name Docket Number
- 9. Operating Mode 6
- 10. Power Level 0
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 10 CFR Part 20 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 10 CFR Part 73 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.69(g) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR Part 21 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 73.77(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 21.2(c) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR Part 50 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
OTHER (Specify here, in abstract or in NRC 366A)
- 12. Licensee Contact for this LER Licensee Contact Richard Sciscente, Licensing Engineer Telephone Number (Include area code)
(772) 467-7156 Cause System Component Manufacturer Reportable To IRIS
Cause
System Component Manufacturer Reportable To IRIS A
BE ISV P032 Y
- 14. Supplemental Report Expected YES (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)
NO
- 15. Expected Submission Date Month Day Year Abstract (Limit to 1560 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On September 16, 2021 with Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, a foreign material exclusion device was found within the valve body of a containment spray isolation valve that was being disassembled and inspected. This foreign object inside the containment spray system limited the capability of one train of containment spray.
Maintenance personnel removed the foreign material. The cause of this event was inadequate instructions for the control of internal foreign material exclusion devices within the valve maintenance procedure. Corrective actions include adding more detail to the valve lapping procedure to strengthen controls for internal foreign material exclusion devices.
This licensee event report is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfilment of the safety function of SSCs needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Postulated failure modes analyzed within the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report demonstrate that no single failure of the containment spray system can prevent it from performing its design function. Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.
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181 logs, none of the instances of this action exceeded the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed to restore operability of at least one train of containment spray.
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I Page 3 of 3
Safety Significance
Postulated failure modes analyzed within the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report demonstrate that no single failure of the containment spray system can prevent it from performing its design function.
The Unit 2 UFSAR Table 6.2-41 describes failure modes and effects for the containment heat removal system. This analysis bounds the containment spray system observations of the event.
Each CS train header provides 100% capability for containment depressurization in response to a design basis accident. Containment depressurization is augmented by four containment fan coolers that together also provide 100% capability and are started automatically on a safety injection actuation signal, providing a diverse method of actuation and defense in depth. In the event of a valid containment spray actuation signal, immediate flow and pressure indications would alert operators to any significant flow blockage of the 2A containment spray header. Operators would respond by ensuring that the other containment depressurization and cooling systems were applied to mitigate the event. This condition will not count against the NRC Performance Indicator for Safety System Functional Failures because during those brief surveillance periods when the 2B train of containment spray was inoperable it was still available and could have been promptly placed into service.
Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Actions
The foreign material was removed from V07162.
The corrective action listed below has been entered into the site corrective action program. Any changes to the action will be managed under the corrective action program.
- 1. Revise the valve lapping procedure to have separate sign off steps for each FME device installation and removal.
Failed Components Identified
- 1. V07162, Isolation Valve for Penetration P-35B Outside Containment Feed from Shutdown Cooling HX 2A Manufacturer:
Pacific Valves
Description
12-in manually operated Pacific Gate Valve with a horizontal stem. The valve body is stainless steel with an ANSI class of 300. This valve is normally locked open during power operations. All of the containment spray header lines are 304 stainless steel, ASME Code Section III Class 2.
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