05000387/LER-2018-006-01, Standby Liquid Control Valve Failed Surveillance Test
| ML18353A430 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/2018 |
| From: | Cimorelli K Susquehanna, Talen Energy |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-7760 LER 2018-006-01 | |
| Download: ML18353A430 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor |
| 3872018006R01 - NRC Website | |
text
Kevin Cimorelli Site Vice President Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3795 Fax 570.542.1504 Kevin.Cimorelli@TalenEnergy.com TALEN~
ENERGY U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2018-006-01 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-7760 OEC 1 9 2018
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- * **-nockef No. 50-387 Attached is a supplement to Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-387/2018-006-00. The LER reported a condition which caused a Standby Liquid Control Pump to fail a surveillance. This condition was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jason Jennings, Manager-NuclearRegulatory Affairs at (570) 542-3155.
Attachment: LER 50-387/2018-006-01 Copy:
NRC Region I Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Ms. L. H. Micewski, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP
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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 13. Page Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 1 OF3
- 4. Title Standby Liquid Control Valve Failed Surveillance Test
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LER Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Sequential Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Month Day Year Number No.
05000 09 26 2018 2018 006 01
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Facility Name Docket Number 05000
- 9. Operating Mode Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)
During the performance of the quarterly flow verification, the 1A Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) Pump could not obtain the Technical Specification required flow of 40 gallons per minute due to the SBLC Injection Pump
'A' Discharge Pressure Relief Valve (PSV148F029A) lifting and being unable to reseat itself. This failed to meet the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1.7.7 and consequently, the 1A SBLC pump was declared inoperable.
This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by technical specifications and 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The 'B' train of Standby Liquid Control had been unavailable during the time the 'A' was inoperable.
The cause of the event was determined to be inadequate work instructions for installing the insulation on the associate.d relief valves. Corrective actions include additional guidance for installing insulation around the relief valves.
There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.
NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
Unit 1 - Mode 1, approximately 95 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 - Mode 1, approximately 98 percent Rated Thermal Power YEAR 2018 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 006 REV NO.
01 As part of the surveillance the 1 8 Standby Liquid Control Pump was taken out of service. While this did not impact the operability of the 1A Standby Liquid Control Pump it does affect the reporting criteria.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
During performance of quarterly Standby Liquid Control (S8LC) flow verification, on September 26, 2018 at approximately 1023, the 1A S8LC Injection Pump 'A' Discharge Pressure Relief Valve [EllS: RV] lifted after the 1A S8LC pump [EIIS:P] was started. The relief valve was unable to reseat itself, resulting in failure to meet Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.7.7 minimum required flow rate of 40 gallons per minute (gpm) and consequently, the 1A S8LC pump was declared inoperable.
Maintenance technicians observed that the insulation [EllS: INS] surrounding the relief valve was in contact with its reset arm. Performance data indicates a rapid decrease in S8LC flow approximately 2 minutes after the initial pump start, and is believed to be the point of the relief valve lifting.
The insulation had been re-installed during the Unit 1 Refuel outage on April 27, 2018. This event is being reported as a condition prohibited by technical specification since insulation interference had existed and in the event of relief valve actuation, the 'A' train would have been inoperable longer than the technical specification completion time. Even though both trains were taken out of service as part of a planned surveillance, the condition of the insulation was discovered during the surveillance which led the 'A' train to be considered inoperable. This is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function since the '8' S8LC pump was taken out of service during the time frame after the insulation had been re-installed. Specifically, on June 28th for a quarterly surveillance and on July 26 for maintenance.
Maintenance replaced the S8LC Injection Pump 'A' Discharge Pressure Relief Valve and corrected the insulation configuration. As found bench testing was performed on the originally installed relief valve on 10/1/18 which satisfactorily passed lift checks.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The cause of the event was determined to be inadequate work instructions on installing the insulation.
There was no information in the routine task instructions advising the insulators on the impact the insulation could have on the moving parts of the valve. Page 2 of 3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1 022/r3f)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Repcrted lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov,
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the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct or spcnsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000-387 2018
ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 006 REV NO.
01 Engineering analysis determined that the Unit 1 '8' SBLC pump would have been unaffected by this condition and would have delivered the required flow rate. The 'A' pump discharge check valve 148F033A would have prevented any '8' loop flow from exiting through the 'A' pressure relief valve, PSV148F029.
Since the '8' loop could have performed the required function, there was no loss of safety function. Note that during quarterly flow surveillance testing both the 'A' and '8' division are declared inoperable and TS 3.1.7.C is entered. Based on this information, either both SBLC systems were available or both systems were inoperable and the appropriate TS was entered.
This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the engineering analysis supporting the system's ability to fulfill the safety function.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Maintenance reconfigured the insulation on the pressure safety valves and shared the lesson learned with the rest of the organization. In addition, Maintenance work instructions were revised to caution insulation installers to ensure the insulation does not impede to travel path of the reset arm.
PREVIOUS OCCURENCES
No previous similar events are known. Page 3 of 3