05000387/LER-2018-006, Standby Liquid Control Valve Failed Surveillance Test

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Standby Liquid Control Valve Failed Surveillance Test
ML18325A066
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/21/2018
From: Cimorelli K
Susquehanna, Talen Energy
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-7755 LER 2018-006-00
Download: ML18325A066 (5)


LER-2018-006, Standby Liquid Control Valve Failed Surveillance Test
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
3872018006R00 - NRC Website

text

Kevin Cimorelli Site Vice President U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3795 Fax 570.542.1504 Kevin.Cimorelli@TalenEnergy.com SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2018-006-00 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-7755 TALEN~.

ENERGY ov 1 2018 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-387/2018-006-00. This LER is reporting a condition which caused a Standby Liquid Control Pump to fail a surveillance. This condition was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jason Jennings, Manager-Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (570) 542-3155.

K/~~

K. Cimorelli Attachment: LER 50-3 87/2018-006-00 Copy:

NRC Region I Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Ms. L. H. Micewski, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP

Electronic Copy:

K. Cimorelli M. M. Tharpe-Kavanaugh (NSRB)

J. R. Jennings D. J. LaMarca N.D. Pagliaro T. Williams G. S. Lubinsky (DBD)

DCS Document Control Desk PLA-7755

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3.Page Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 1 OF3

4. Title Standby Liquid Control Valve Failed Surveillance Test
5. Event Date
6. LER Number
7. Report Date
8. Other Facilities Involved Sequential Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Month Day Year Number No.

05000 09 26 2018 2018 006 00 I \\ ~\\ do )y;'

Facility Name Docket Number 05000

9. Operating Mode 12 14 2018 Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines}

During the performance of the quarterly flow verification, the 1A Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) Pump could not obtain the Technical Specification required flow of 40 gallons per minute due to the SBLC Injection Pump

'A' Discharge Pressure Relieve Valve (PSV148F029A) lifting and being unable to reseat itself. This failed to meet the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.1. 7. 7 and consequently, the 1A SBLC pump was declared inoperable.

This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by technical specifications and 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The 'B' train of Standby Liquid Control had been unavailable during the time the 'A' was inoperable.

This event is still under investigation. A supplement will be issued at a later date.

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.

NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit 1 - Mode 1, approximately 95 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 - Mode 1, approximately 98 percent Rated Thermal Power YEAR 2018 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 006 REV NO.

00 As part of the surveillance the 1 B Standby Liquid Control Pump was taken out of service. While this did not impact the operability of the 1A Standby Liquid Control Pump it does affect the reporting criteria.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

During the performance of the quarterly flow verification, on September 26, 2018 at approximately 1023, the 1A Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) Injection Pump 'A' Discharge Pressure Relief Valve [EllS: RV] lifted after the SBLC pump [EIIS:P] was started. The relief valve was unable to reseat itself, resulting in the pump obtaining 28 gallons per minute (gpm). This failed to meet Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.7.7 required flow rate of 40-gpm and consequently, the 1A SBLC pump was declared inoperable.

Maintenance technicians observed that the insulation [EllS: INS] surrounding the relief valve was in contact with it's reset arm. Performance data indicates a rapid decrease in SBLC flow approximately 2 minutes after the initial pump start, and is believed to be the point of the relief valve lifting.

The insulation had been installed during the Unit 1 Refuel outage on April 27, 2018. This event is being reported as a condition prohibited by technical specification since the 'A' train would have been inoperable longer than the technical specification completion time. Even though both trains were taken out of service as part of a planned surveillance, the condition of the insulation was discovered during the surveillance which led the 'A' train to be considered inoperable. This is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function since the 'B' SBLC pump was taken out of service during the time frame since the insulation had been installed. Specifically, on June 28th for a quarterly surveillance and on July 26 for maintenance.

Maintenance replaced the PSV148F029A and corrected the installation of the insulation. As found bench testing was performed on the originally installed PSV148F029A on 1 0/1/18 which satisfactorily passed lift checks.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event is still under investigation. A supplement will be issued at a later date. Page 2 of 3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1 022/r3[J Es!ima!ed burden per response !o comply wi!h !his mandatory collection request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated in!o !he licensing process and fed back !o industry. Send comments regarding burden es!ima!e !o !he Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail !o lnfocol!ec!s.Resource@nrc.gov,

~

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!he Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budge!, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used !o impose an information collection does no! display a curren!ly valid OMS control number, !he NRC may no! conduct or sponsor, and a person is no! required !o respond !o, !he information collection.

3. LER NUMBER YEAR Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000-387 2018

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 006 REV NO.

00 Engineering analysis determined that the Unit 1 '8' SBLC pump would have been unaffected by this condition and would have delivered the required flow rate. The 'A' pump discharge check valve 148F033A would have prevented any '8' loop flow from exiting through the 'A' pressure relief valve, PSV148F029.

Since the '8' loop could have performed the required function, there was no loss of safety function. Note that during quarterly flow surveillance testing both the 'A' and '8' division are declared inoperable and TS 3.1. 7. C is entered. Based on this information, either both SBLC systems were available or both systems were inoperable and the appropriate TS was entered.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of the event is still under investigation. A supplement will be issued at a later date.

PREVIOUS OCCURENCES

No previous occurrences are known. Page 3 of 3