05000387/LER-2002-001, Unit 1 Temporary Loss of Control Structure Chillers
| ML021230338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/2002 |
| From: | Shriver B Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-5469 LER 02-001-00 | |
| Download: ML021230338 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3872002001R00 - NRC Website | |
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Bryce L. Shriver PPL Susquehanna, LLC Vice President - Nuclear Site Operations P.O. Box 467, Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3120 Fax 570.542.1477 pp:
blshrivercpplweb.com Ps T
AFR 2 3 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2002-001-00 PLA - 5469 FILE R41-2 Docket No. 50-387 License No. NPF-14 Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-387/2002-001-00, which discusses the temporary loss of both Control Structure Chillers. This event is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. This event was of low safety significance and resulted in no adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public.
ryc L. Shriver Vice President - Nuclear Site Operations Attachment cc:
Mr. H. J. Miller Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 cc:
Mr. S. L. Hansell Sr. Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035
Abstract
On February 22, 2002 with Unit 1 at 81% power and Unit 2 at 100% power, the 'B' Control Structure (CS) Chiller (EIIS: KM) tripped when an operator placed the chiller's handswitch from 'Auto' to 'Start' following an automatic start of the equipment. The 'B' chiller automatically started when the 'A' chiller tripped during post-maintenance testing. The cause of the 'B' CS Chiller trip was lack of specific procedural guidance for the operating condition. In the absence of procedural guidance for a chiller after automatically starting, operators typically place the handswitch from 'Auto' to 'Start' to bring the equipment alignment within generic operating guidance. The handswitch "break-before-make" design imposes an additional start event on the equipment for this action, and the resulting electrical transient tripped the electrical supply breaker for the associated equipment fan. The appropriate operating procedure for the CS Chillers will be revised to provide guidance following an automatic start of the equipment to avoid similar operator-induced trips. This event is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v). Based upon the simplicity of resetting the electrical supply breaker and the short amount of time that no chillers were available, this event resulted in very low safety significance. There were no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) event resulted in very low safety significance. There were no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
In accordance with guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 2, the due date for this report is April 23, 2002.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The appropriate operating procedure for the CS Chillers will be revised to provide guidance following an automatic start of the equipment to avoid similar operator-induced trips.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Past Similar Events:
None Failed Component:
None