05000382/FIN-2017002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Ensure Containment Equipment Hatch Closure Prior to RCS Time to Boil |
Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8, Procedures and Programs, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, which occurred because the licensee did not implement instructions for maintaining containment integrity. Specifically, on April 18, 2017, the licensee did not ensure that the containment equipment hatch could be closed within the calculated reactor coolant system time to boil as required by Licensee Procedure OP-010-006, Outage Operations, Revision 330. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2017-02541. The licensees corrective actions included exiting the applicable condition, re-performing the equipment hatch closure drill to show the equipment hatch could be closed prior to the reactor coolant system time to boil, and performing repairs to the containment equipment hatch. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with thehuman performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensee must close containment penetrations prior to the reactor coolant system time to boil in order to minimize radionuclide releases under accident conditions. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, instructed the inspectors to use Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because licensee maintained in-depth shutdown capability and because the duration of the performance deficiency was less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The inspectors concluded that the finding had a teamwork cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because individuals and work groups did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety was maintained. Specifically, personnel performed work resulting in a short calculated reactor coolant system time to boil without first communicating their actions to operations or the outage control center, resulting in an unexpected plant condition [H.4]. |
Site: | Waterford |
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Report | IR 05000382/2017002 Section 1R13 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
Inspectors (proximate) | F Ramirez C Speer B Correll S Graves N Greene R Kopriva J O'Donnell G Miller |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2017002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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