05000382/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Prepare the Site for Impending Adverse Weather |
| Description | The inspectors identified multiple examples of a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8, Procedures and Programs, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, for the licensees failure to follow Licensee Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding, Revision 323. Specifically, on three occasions, the licensee did not close exterior doors when required by the procedure due to potential severe weather conditions. As a result, plant equipment was at an increased failure risk due to severe weather at the site. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-WF3-2017-03961 and CR-WF3-2017-04944. The licensee is planning corrective actions to ensure doors do not remain blocked open during conditions that require their closure.The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to maintain all of the doors required by Licensee Procedure OP-901-521 with all fuel offloaded to the spent fuel pool threatened the licensees ability to maintain the functionality of the spent fuel pool cooling system. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, and determined that a qualitative analysis by a senior reactor analyst was required. The senior reactor analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Signifiance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, the senior reactor analyst performed a bounding analysis indicated that the total increase in core damage frequency from the failure to close the doors during severe weather was less than 1E-6. The finding had a work management cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the organization did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority and the work process did not include the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups of job activities. Specifically, during the planning and executing of work activities associated with Refueling Outage 21, the licensee did not consider the nuclear safety implications of blocking open exterior watertight and tornado doors and the work process did not include the identification and management of the risk associated with the blocked-open doors [H.5]. |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2017002 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ramirez C Speer B Correll S Graves N Greene R Kopriva J O'Donnell G Miller |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2017002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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