05000382/FIN-2014007-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Initiate a Condition Report for a Condition Adverse to Quality |
| Description | The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformance are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, between October 8 and 16, 2014, the licensee failed to initiate a condition report to evaluate the lack of missile protection on the emergency diesel generator A and B storage tank vents, a nonconformance that is a condition adverse to quality. In response to this issue, the licensee performed an operability determination to address the teams concerns and initiated a separate condition report to document the failure to initiate a report for a condition adverse to quality. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR-WF3-2014-05341 and CR-WF3-2014-05738. The team determined that the failure to initiate a condition report to evaluate the lack of missile protection on the emergency diesel generator A and B storage tank vents for 8 days was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly initiate and evaluate a condition adverse to quality, a design nonconformance on the emergency diesel generator A and B storage tank vents for missile protection. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, this finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non- technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work management because the licensee failed to implement a process where nuclear safety is the overriding priority and the need for coordinating with different work groups (H.5). |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2014007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Larson E Ruesch G Gardner G Ottenberg P Wagner S Makor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2014007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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