05000382/FIN-2014005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow the Operability Determination Process |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to assess immediate operability of safety-related systems in accordance with site procedures, in three separate instances. Specifically, on two occasions, the licensee did not properly assess operability of safety-related relays in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal system, which in turn brought into question the operability of the emergency diesel generators. A third example involved the licensees failure to properly assess operability of safety-related class 3 piping in the dry cooling towers, which brought into question the operability of the component cooling water system. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as condition report CR-WF3-2014-06014. The licensee restored compliance by revising the immediate operability determinations to reflect an adequate reason to justify operability of the systems in question. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failing to follow the Operability Determination procedure caused the licensee to incorrectly assess the capability of the systems impacted by the relays and dry cooling tower tube leak to perform their safety function and there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the systems. The inspectors determined the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the design or qualification of the system, did not represent the loss of a safety system or function, did not represent the loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process, because individuals did not use a consistent, systematic approach to make a decision, and risk insights were not incorporated appropriately [H.13] (Section 1R15). |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2014005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Speer F Ramirez N Greene P Elkmann P Hernandez R Lantz |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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