05000382/FIN-2013003-05

Finding

Title

Failure to provide adequate post modification testing instructions for vibration monitoring on the feedwater piping system

Description

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, because the licensee did not provide post modification testing instructions for activities affecting quality that were appropriate to the circumstances and that included appropriate acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee did not provide adequate post modification testing instructions for vibration monitoring of the feedwater piping system that included appropriate acceptance criteria following the installation of the new replacement steam generators. As a result, the plant experienced an automatic reactor trip and a subsequent down power due to an increase in vibrations on the feedwater piping system without appropriate acceptance criteria and monitoring during power ascension. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WF3-2013-0445. The immediate corrective actions taken to restore compliance included the implementation of a revised vibration-monitoring plan to include appropriate acceptance criteria and the development of engineering changes to mitigate vibration effects on the feedwater piping system. The failure to provide adequate post modification testing instructions for vibration monitoring of feedwater piping system following steam generator replacement was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors used the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, to evaluate this issue. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient initiator did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The inspectors concluded that the finding reflected current licensee performance and involved a cross-cutting aspect in the operating experience component of the problem identification and resolution area in that the licensee did not implement operating experience through changes to station equipment to support plant safety.

05
Site:	Waterford
Report	IR 05000382/2013003 Section 4OA5
Date counted	Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Initiating Events
Identified by:	Self-revealing
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate)	M Davis G George D Allen R Azua M Baquera N Okonkwo M Williams D Bradley
Violation of:	10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V
CCA	P.5, Operating Experience
INPO aspect	CL.1
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v • d • e

Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2013003

0(0)1(0)2(3)3(5)4(4)5(3)6(0)7(1)8(1)403(0)404(2)406(0)501(0)502(0)

IR 05000382/2013003: 1 2 3 4 5

Finding List (Waterford) @ 2013Q2

CCA Matrix: 2013Q2

	Q	CCA	Title
05000382/FIN-2012403-04	2012Q3	H.9	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-03	2012Q3	H.10	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-02	2012Q3	H.14	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-01	2012Q3		Security
05000382/FIN-2012008-05	2012Q3	H.8	Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition
05000382/FIN-2012008-04	2012Q3	H.8	Failue to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status
05000382/FIN-2012008-03	2012Q3	H.6	Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for Flood Control Measures
05000382/FIN-2012008-02	2012Q3	H.6	Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency Feedwater Pump AB
05000382/FIN-2012008-01	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators
05000382/FIN-2012004-01	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Establish Procedural Controls to Ensure That Licensed Operators Could Perform Immediate and Time Critical Operator Actions Associated with Security and Fire Events
05000382/FIN-2012004-02	2012Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct Degraded Conditions Associated with the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Control Valve
05000382/FIN-2012004-03	2012Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct a Torn Diaphragm of a SAFETY-RELATED Air Operated Valve Associated with the Emergency Feedwater System
05000382/FIN-2012004-04	2012Q3	H.13	Failure to Adequately Access and Manage Risk Before Performing Maintenance Activities Associated with NON-STANDARD Lifts
05000382/FIN-2012005-03	2012Q4		Reactor Auxiliary Building Roof Flood Protection Issue
05000382/FIN-2012005-02	2012Q4	P.2	Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct the Cause of Repetitive Failures Associated with Train a Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor
05000382/FIN-2012005-01	2012Q4	H.5	Failure to Implement Control Measures to Ensure That Activated Materials Were Not Raised Above or Brought Near the Surface of the Refueling Pool, Causing a Locked High Radiation Area
05000382/FIN-2013002-03	2013Q1	P.2	Failure to Identify and Perform Testing to Demonstrate Local Manual Operation Action on SAFETY-RELATED AIR-OPERATED Valves
05000382/FIN-2013002-02	2013Q1	H.14	Failure to Perform an Adequate Operability Determination for Nitrogen Leak in MSIV
05000382/FIN-2013002-01	2013Q1	H.7	Failure to Identify and Control Potential Tornado Borne Missle Hazards
05000382/FIN-2012404-02	2013Q1	H.14	Security
05000382/FIN-2012404-01	2013Q1	H.7	Security
05000382/FIN-2013003-05	2013Q2	P.5	Failure to provide adequate post modification testing instructions for vibration monitoring on the feedwater piping system
05000382/FIN-2013003-04	2013Q2		Failure to submit an LER after discovery that manual handwheels on AOVs were not functional
05000382/FIN-2013003-03	2013Q2	H.13	Failure to comply with Action 4 of TS 3.3.1 during shutdown in Modes 4 and 5
05000382/FIN-2013003-02	2013Q2		Failure to Update Fuel Handling Accident Analysis in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
05000382/FIN-2013003-01	2013Q2	P.1	Failure to provide design control measures to withstand the effects of flooding on the reactor auxiliary building roof

Self-Identified List (Waterford)

	Q	Title
05000382/FIN-2012008-06	2012Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000382/FIN-2012005-04	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000382/FIN-2012005-05	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Waterford Findings full list]

05000382/FIN-2013003-05

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