05000369/FIN-2016003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires, in part, that procedures for certain activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, be established, implemented, and maintained. Administrative procedures for shift and relief turnover is one of the identified activities. Administrative procedure AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 4, implements the licensees shift and relief turnover standards. This procedure requires shift turnovers to contain detailed information on equipment and system status, alignments, and activities, to ensure watchstanders have a complete understanding of plant status. Contrary to the above, from August 10 to August 13, 2015, operators were not aware of the required nuclear service water system alignment which required a continuous vent (passing water flow) to be maintained in the condenser cooling water (RC) suction supply to the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The continuous vent mitigates the potential for air entrainment in the RC piping high point and is needed in order for the standby shutdown system to be functional during an Appendix R fire event when the suction of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump is transferred from the auxiliary feedwater storage tank to the long term water supply provided by the RC system. This lack of operator awareness stemmed from a misunderstanding in the operator turnovers that the nuclear service water system was in a standby nuclear service water pond cooling alignment, which does not require the continuous vent to be maintained. The discrepancy was subsequently identified by oncoming shift operations personnel and the continuous vent was re-established on August 16, 2015, after removing material that obstructed the continuous vent line. As a result of not maintaining the continuous vent at the suction of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the standby shutdown system was rendered non-functional for a period of eleven days, which was in excess of the 7-day limit allowed by Selected Licensee Commitments 16.9.7. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it only affected the non-safety related Appendix R water supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as NCR 01943414. |
| Site: | McGuire  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000369/2016003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Hutto C Fontana F Ehrhardt J Hickman J Zeiler R Cureton S Sanchez |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - McGuire - IR 05000369/2016003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (McGuire) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (McGuire)
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