05000369/FIN-2016002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Ensure Containment Equipment Hatch Was Properly Closed During Fuel Movements |
| Description | An NRC-identified Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately implement the commitments in Selective Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9.25, Refueling Operations Containment Equipment Hatch, which required the containment equipment hatch to be closed during the movement of non-recently irradiated fuel inside containment. Specifically, during reactor vessel fuel reload activities, the inspectors identified that the equipment hatch was left partially open due to the failure to properly tighten the bolts evenly around the hatch resulting in direct communication of the containment atmosphere with the environment. The licensee took immediate corrective action to suspend fuel movements and properly tighten the equipment hatch bolts prior to resuming fuel movements and entered the issue into their corrective action program as ARs 02018605 and 02018701. The PD was more than minor because it impacted the configuration control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the PD would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the radiological barrier functionality of the containment equipment hatch was degraded due to the gap opening which could have allowed direct access of radiological releases from the containment atmosphere to the outside environment during a potential fuel handling accident inside containment. The inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Because the finding degraded the ability to close or isolate the containment, it required review using IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. While the containment boundary function was considered degraded, the incident occurred eight days after the beginning of the refueling outage when short lived volatile radioisotopes had decayed sufficiently such that the potential radiological releases to the public would not likely contribute to the large early release frequency (LERF). Based on this, the finding was screened as having very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the PD was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee failed to follow containment equipment hatch closing procedures which explicitly required performing a visual inspection that the containment equipment hatch was sealed and secured with metal-to-metal contact with the containment hatch flange and had no visual gaps. |
| Site: | McGuire  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000369/2016002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen C Dykes F Ehrhardt J Rivera-Ortiz J Zeiler M Bloodgood M Meeks P Capehart R Cureton S Shah |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - McGuire - IR 05000369/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (McGuire) @ 2016Q2
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