A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by inspectors for the licensees failure to perform required extent of condition assessments for Quick Cause Evaluations (QCE) in accordance with McGuires Quality Assurance Program. Specifically, Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 212, Cause Analysis, requires in part that an Extent of Condition review shall be conducted as soon as possible when a QCE is performed. One example included the licensees failure to perform an extent of condition assessment for a QCE of the safety-related
NSW system. To address this issue, the license entered
PIP M-12-6309 into their
CAP. The failure to perform the required extent of condition assessments for QCE in accordance with NSD 212 was considered a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the
mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensees failure to evaluate events for extent of condition applicability for the Nuclear
Service Water issue (
PIP M-12-0106) was not only a failure to follow a procedure requirement, but allowed the station to be susceptible to the existence of similar discrepancies in other systems, units, organizations, programs, processes, components, or trains. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than allowed technical specification allowed outage time. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures.