The inspectors identified a
NCV of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to establish acceptance criteria to determine operability in surveillance procedures used to vent the
decay heat removal system in Modes 5, 6, and No-Mode in preparation for Mode 6. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as
PIP M-11-04745 the licensees failure to establish adequate acceptance criteria for ND venting surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4200/036 and PT/2/A/4200/036 was a performance deficiency. The
PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to establish acceptance criteria for surveillance tests which establish the basis for the ND system operability in modes 5 and 6 would have the potential to
lead to a more significant safety concern in that conditions which could impact system operability could remain undetected. In addition, the finding adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the
mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using
IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations
Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a quantitative assessment was not required based on the criteria in Attachment 1. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of implementation of operating experience in the Operating Experience component in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to implement operating experience from
Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 into station procedures
