McGuire Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.(4) and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.(4) required the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved
Fire Protection Program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as updated, for the facility and as approved in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated March 1978, and Supplements 2, 5, and 6 dated March 1979, April 1981, and February 1983, respectively, and the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated May 15, 1989. The licensees approved
fire protection program committed to
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.
Section III.G specified that fire protection features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency shutdown stations can be repaired within
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Contrary to the above, since the Safety Evaluation Report issued in 1978, the licensee failed to have fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage so that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions could be repaired within
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. These conditions have existed since original plant construction and were applicable to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The NRC is exercising
enforcement discretion for this nonconformance in accordance with the
NRC Enforcement Policy, Interim
Enforcement Policy Regarding
Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (
10 CFR 50.48), because the licensee documented their commitment to adopt
NFPA 805 and change their fire protection licensing basis to comply with
10 CFR 50.48(c) prior to December 31, 2005, and it was likely this issue would have been identified and addressed during the licensees transition to
NFPA 805, it was entered into the licensees corrective action program, immediate corrective action and compensatory measures were taken, it was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, it was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high safety significance.
