05000368/FIN-2016002-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Unit 2 Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, requires that the radiation monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-6, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, shall be operable with their alarm/trip set points within the specified limits. Table 3.3-6, Item 2.a requires that the containment purge and exhaust radiation monitoring instrumentation be capable of isolating containment when process radiation equals or exceeds two times the background radiation rate. Contrary to the above, on October 26, 2015, the licensee failed to ensure that the required containment purge and exhaust radiation monitor remained operable to isolate containment when process radiation equals or exceeds two times the background radiation rate. Specifically, the licensee failed to restart the containment purge and exhaust isolation radiation monitor sample pump, which supplies process sample flow to the radiation monitor, following an electrical bus transfer which removed power to the sample pump. As a result, the containment ventilation system would not have automatically isolated to prevent a release of radioactive material in the event of a fuel handling accident. However, operators could manually isolate the ventilation system if a fuel accident occurred. An operator restarted the process sample pump and documented the issue in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-04197. Because the finding degraded the ability to close or isolate the containment, NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, dated May 9, 2014, directed the inspectors to use NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, dated May 6, 2004. The inspectors classified the finding as a degraded condition that has potentially important implications for the integrity of the containment, without affecting the likelihood of core damage (Type B). Using the Phase 1 screening for Type B findings, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance or Green, because the deficiency did not occur within eight days of the start of the refueling outage. |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000368/2016002 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Barrett B Tindell M Tobin N O'Keefe |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000368/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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