05000354/LER-2003-005
| Hope Creek Generating Station | |
| Event date: | 02-24-2003 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 07-02-2003 |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542003005R00 - NRC Website | |
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric — Boiling Water Reactor (BVVR/4) Emergency Onsite Power Supply System — EIIS Identifier {EK}* Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE
Event Date: February 24, 2003 Discovery Date: May 8, 2003
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE
The plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (POWER OPERATION) at the time of the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE
On February 24, 2003, during fuel rack lubrication on "B" Hope Creek Emergency Diesel Generator Engine {EK} using procedure HC.OP-DL.ZZ-0006 (Q), step 1.2, the number two fuel injection pump rack was found stuck. The fuel pump was replaced on the number two cylinder and the diesel returned to an operable condition on February 25, 2003. A post mortem analysis of the injector failure was performed. The results of the analysis show that this could have only been caused by internal debris. The monthly surveillance had been performed on that diesel the previous day. The injectors are checked as part of that surveillance after the run has occurred. The nature of the failure is such that it is highly unlikely for the injector to have spontaneously failed and bound up without the diesel having been run or the injector manually operated. Based upon this, on May 8, 2003, it was concluded that the injector had failed at the completion of the previous monthly surveillance run. The non-licensed operator who performed the post run fuel rack injector check indicated that the injector test was performed in accordance with the procedure and performed satisfactorily. The forensic evidence does not support this. The operator was familiar with the task and properly demonstrated the technique as part of the interview. It is possible that the equipment operator became spatially disoriented and believed that he had checked all of the injectors and in reality had missed one. Based on the above it was determined that the "B" EDG was out of service from February 22, 2003 at 16:37 hours until February 25 at 21:17 hours. This exceeded the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> required by TS 3.8.1.1 Action b to return the EDG to an operable condition.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6)
- ■ DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (continued) Shift managers rolled out this evaluation as a lessons learned to all shift personnel, emphasizing the need for attention to detail and the use of STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review) when performing multiple actions within a single procedural step.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE
The apparent cause associated with being in a condition not allowed by TS 3.8.1.1 Action b was personnel error.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs at Salem and Hope Creek generating stations dating back to 2001 has determined that no other reportable events similar to this have occurred.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
Although the "B" EDG was inoperable for greater than the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by the action statement in Hope Creek Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, there was no impact to the ability to either safely shutdown the plant or respond to a design basis accident. In the event that a design basis accident occurred during the time the "B" EDG was inoperable, the two sources of offsite power to the safety related busses remained operable. In the event of an accident, the required mitigation equipment would have been supplied power from the offsite power source and therefore the entire complement of accident mitigation equipment remained available. The Class lE AC power system at Hope Creek is divided into four independent power supply channels, A, B, C, and D. Each of these four channels supplies loads in its own load group. All the Class lE loads are assigned to these channels so that any combination of three out of four load groups has the capability to supply the minimum required safety loads to safely shut down the unit and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Each Class lE 4.16-kV bus is provided with a normal and an alternate offsite power supply feeder and one EDG feeder. The remaining OPERABLE EDGs (A, C, and D) are able to mitigate the consequences of a DBA in conjunction with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) condition. Based on the above, there was no impact to the health and safety of the public.
A review of this condition determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline has not occurred.
(1-2601) 1 �
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
1. Immediate corrective action was to replace fuel pump on number two cylinder.
2. Individual involved has been counseled in accordance with Company policies.
3. Operations personnel have reviewed the fuel rack check and lubrication task and have identified the Human Performance Error traps present in each activity. Error reduction techniques will be implemented to reduce the potential for the creation of an error likely situation during future performance of these tasks.
4. This event will be added to the Operating Experience Database to be used in future pre-job briefs.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.