05000352/FIN-2009003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Assess Erratic Time Delay Relay Operation on Unit 2 HPCI Operability |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with the failure to adequately assess erratic time delay relay operation on Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system operability in a timely manner commensurate with the potential safety significance. Following a failed surveillance test, the Unit 2 HPCI system was considered operable despite erratic operation of a system time delay relay and the operators failure to adequately address the relays design basis function. Exelon placed this issue in the CAP (IR 933745). Exelons corrective actions included: performing operations shift crew briefings on the issue; emphasizing the need for applying a questioning attitude; and requesting timely engineering support for emergent Technical Specifications (TS) equipment issues. Also, a structured operability determination template was added to the corrective action program IR form. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because it did not represent a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than the TS allowed outage time; was not associated with a design or qualification deficiency; and did not screen as risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in Human Performance, Decision-Making, because Exelon did not make a safety-significant decision using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained (H.1(a)). Specifically, Exelon did not obtain timely interdisciplinary input and review on a safety significant decision in that site engineering did not review the operations decision and operations did not implement the subsequent engineering recommendation until two days after the failed surveillance. |
| Site: | Limerick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000352/2009003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Dipaolo T Moslak J Lilliendahl T Burns N Sieller P Krohn |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Limerick - IR 05000352/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Limerick) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Limerick)
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