The inspectors identified a Green
NCV of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to translate minimum room temperatures assumed in an isolation actuation instrumentation setpoint calculation into Unit 1 and 2 procedures such that reactor building room temperatures were maintained above the minimum assumed. As a result, the reactor enclosure and refueling area ventilation systems were not operated to assure that room temperatures were maintained above the minimum assumed in design basis calculations. Exelon entered the issue into the Corrective Action Program (
CAP) for resolution. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the
Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and affected the
Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, including containment, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in Human Performance, Decision Making, because the licensee did not make a safety significant decision using a systematic process to ensure safety was maintained
H.1(a). Specifically, the decision to operate the reactor buildings at lower temperatures was made using an informal process within operations, therefore interdisciplinary input and a review by engineering and other support organizations was not obtaine