05000346/FIN-2014007-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Install and Control RCP Seal Cavity Vent Flexible Hoses Per Design Basis Analysis |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control for the licensees failure to install and control the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal cavity vent flexible hoses per the design basis analysis. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly translate the design basis installation configuration and installation fatigue analysis in calculation SP-274-I, Pipe Stress Analysis: Reactor Coolant Pump 1-1-1 Seal Cavity Vent, into specifications, drawings, procedures, an
instructions. The licensee entered this finding into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) to review the lack of controls over the installation of the flexible hoses, but determined that the flexible hoses remained operable. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, if lef uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to install and control the flexible hoses in accordance with the design basis analysis could lead to failure of the hoses due to operation beyond their analyzed limits. The finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) because the finding could not result in exceeding the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate for a small Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) after a reasonable assessment of degradation, and it could not have likely affected other systems used to mitigate a LOCA resulting in a total loss of their function after a reasonable assessment of degradation. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect, Design Margins, in the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, the licensee did not carefully guard and change the RCP seal cavity vent lines, which form part of the RCS fission product barrier, through a systematic and rigorous process. [H.6] |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2014007 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | I Hafeez J Gilliam L Cain L Rodriguez R Daley |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2014007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||