05000338/FIN-2011011-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trouble Alarm |
| Description | The team conducted an independent review of control room activities with respect to the EOPs to determine if licensee staff responded properly during the events. The team also reviewed the licensees implementation of abnormal, alarm and normal operating procedures used during the event. The review included the effectiveness of the procedures in addressing the event. With respect to operator awareness and decision making, the team was specifically focused on the effectiveness of control board monitoring, communications, technical decision making, and work practices of the operating crew. With respect to command and control, the team specifically focused on actions taken by the control room leadership in managing the operating crews response to the event. The team performed the following activities in order to understand and/or confirm the control room operating crews actions to diagnose the event and implement corrective actions: nConducted interviews with control room operations personnel on shift during the event. nReviewed procedures, narrative logs, event recorder data, system drawings, and plant computer data. nReviewed the crews implementation of emergency, abnormal, and alarm procedures as well as Technical Specifications Reviewed Operations administrative procedures concerning shift manning and procedure use and coordination b. Observations and Findings The team concluded that EOPs were performed consistent with training. The team determined that operators exhibited fundamental operator competencies when responding to the event while using EOPs. Specifically, the team determined that the operating crew identified important off-normal parameters and alarms in a timely manner for the external seismic event and the subsequent LOOP. Additionally, the team determined that crew supervision exercised effective oversight of plant status, crew performance, and site resources. Monitoring of Plant Parameters and Alarms Through a review of plant data, the team determined that the crews response to the seismic event was effective in stabilizing the plant. Through interviews and review of plant data, the team determined that the crew recognized the seismic event and resulting LOOP. Based on interviews, the on-shift crews for each unit assessed the plant conditions as being consistent with what was experienced during simulator training for a LOOP. Based on the sequence of events, a review of plant data, and operator interviews, the team concluded that the LOOP prevented the normal access to plant online Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) because the document server was powered from offsite power. The procedures were available in the control room as paper copies. EOPs and Abnormal Procedures (APs) were readily available during the event with no delay. Based on operator interviews, the team concluded that the operators completed a satisfactory review and evaluation of alarm conditions after the event. Command and Control Based on NRC inspector observations during the event and interviews and a review of plant data, the team determined that the Shift Manager (SM) and Shift Technical Advisor (STA) maintained oversight of the plant, which included awareness of major plant parameters such as RCS temperature and pressurizer level, during the event. Based on observation and interviews, the team determined that the SM effectively managed the frequency and duration of crew updates and crew briefs during the event. Crew updates were reasonable based on the implementation of EOPs. The team concluded that the SM and Control Room Supervisor (CRS) ensured monitoring and diagnosis of key major plant parameters, such as RCS temperature, pressurizer level, and VCT level, by control room crew members. Based on a review of plant data, the team concluded that the management expectation for establishing positive control of equipment configuration was implemented by the operating crew. Through interviews and a review of plant data and alarm response 39 Enclosure procedures, the team determined that the SM and CRS ensured that sufficient information necessary to assess abnormal electric plant status was collected and evaluated prior to performing steps within a procedure that assumed a normal electric plant configuration. During interviews, operators stated that the loss of the document computer for ARPs was not a common scenario in training packages. The licensee was considering addressing this in their training program. The team determined that the loss of the document computer only affected ARPs and did not significantly affect operator performance during the event. Resource Utilization Through interviews, the team determined that the Balance of Plant (BOP) operators and off-shift operators were available to assist the control room operators in recognizing and diagnosing off-normal issues. The seismic event occurred on dayshift which provided additional resources to the control room crew. The utilization of operators during the dual unit trip was adequate. Other Operating Procedures The team observed that procedure 1-AR-F-D8, Turbine Driven AFW Pump Trouble or Lube Oil Trouble did not state that the low lube oil level switch was powered from non-vital power. Upon a loss of power, the lube oil level switch will generate an alarm signal and the alarm, which has a different power source, will activate. The alarm procedure did not recognize this issue. During interviews, operators revealed they were unsure as to why the alarm was lit and the issue required additional troubleshooting. This resulted in a short delay in the alignment of the Unit 1 terry turbine AFW pump to the steam generator. An unresolved item will be opened pending completion of this review. The issue will be identified as URI 05000338, 339/2011011-05: Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trouble Alarm. |
| Site: | North Anna  |
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| Report | IR 05000338/2011011 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Kolcum L Suggs M Chakravorty M Franke R Jackson S Park S Walker V Mccree Y Li |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - North Anna - IR 05000338/2011011 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (North Anna) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (North Anna)
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