05000336/FIN-2009003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | License Condition 2.H for Unit 3 states, in part, that Dominion shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the FSAR. The Fire Protection Evaluation Report of the FSAR requires Dominion to comply with Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1, position C.5.c for alternative or dedicated shutdown capability. The BTP CMEB 9.5-1, positionC.5.c(1) requires in part that, During the post fire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables is maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal AC power, and the fission product boundary integrity is not affected. Contrary to this, from initial plant operation until Unit 3 entered cold shutdown conditions on October 12, 2008, implementing the alternative shutdown method while a SI Sactuation occurred during certain postulated fires requiring control room evacuation, could result in a water-solid pressurizer and water relief through the pressurizer safety relief valves. The pressurizer safety relief valves are not qualified for water relief and may fail to open. This finding was entered into Dominions Corrective Action Program (CR 107561). Dominion promptly established compensatory actions consistent with Unit 3s fire protection program requirements on August 29, 2008,when the fire protection program nonconformance was identified. Dominion subsequently completed a plant modification to the safety injection circuits during the Fall 2008 refuel outage and eliminated the potential for a single spurious actuation of the SIS resulting in pressurizer overfill. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the external factors attribute (fire) of the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, a control room fire requiring evacuation while a spurious SIS injection signal occurred could have caused the pressurizer to fill solid and pressurizer safety relief valves to relieve water. The inspectors used Phase 3 of the NRCs IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP), to determine that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) |
| Site: | Millstone  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000336/2009003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Moslak M Patel W Schmidt B Haagensen J Krafty J Daniel Orrs Shaffer J Tomlinson J Nicholson R Bellamy J Schmidt O Masnyk-Bailey |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Millstone - IR 05000336/2009003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Millstone) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Millstone)
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