05000333/LER-2015-004
| James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material |
| Initial Reporting | |
| ENS 51405 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material |
| 3332015004R00 - NRC Website | |
'0001, or by intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of CONTINUATION SHEET information and Regulatory Affairs. NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, ashington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a urrenfty valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not wired to respond to, the information collection.
Background
The Secondary Containment [ENS identifier: NG] boundary surrounds the primary containment and refueling equipment. The boundary forms a control volume to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products. The Secondary Containment consists of four systems which include the Reactor Building, the Reactor Building Isolation and Control System, the Standby Gas Treatment System, and the Main Stack. Secondary Containment is designed to provide containment for postulated design basis accident scenarios: loss-of- coolant accident and refueling (fuel handling) accident. Since pressure may increase in Secondary Containment relative to the environmental pressure, support systems are required to maintain a differential pressure vacuum such that external atmosphere would leak into containment rather than fission products leak out.
The systems which maintain a differential pressure vacuum inside Secondary Containment include the normal Reactor Building Ventilation and Cooling (RBV) System [VA] (during normal plant operations) and the safety- related Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System [BH] for post-accident conditions.
Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 requires one Secondary Containment access door in each access opening to remain closed. Failure to meet this SR results in the Secondary Containment Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) not being met, and requires the Secondary Containment to be declared Inoperable.
Event Description
On September 17, 2015, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100 percent power, a member of the Radiation Protection (RP) department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) were about to conduct a walk down of the Reactor Building, and entered the north door of the north Secondary Containment access opening on Elevation 272'. A chemistry contractor simultaneously entered the same Secondary Containment access opening via the opposing door on the south side, which resulted in the concurrent opening of the airlock doors. This condition was corrected within approximately five (5) seconds. At the time of the closure of either door, secondary containment integrity was restored as the SR for one door closed was met, and no other SRs (such as negative pressure) were being exceeded. Therefore at this time, the condition no longer exists.
For the condition in which Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 for at least one door in secondary containment access opening being closed, the TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.6.4.1 required action was to restore secondary containment to Operable status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. A short term LCO declaring Secondary Containment inoperable was entered at the time of discovery and subsequently exited.
An NRC notification was made via ENS 51405. This Licensing Event Report (LER) is being submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety function to control the release of radioactive material.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information C:' ections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555- 0001, or by intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a -urrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is not lr equired to respond to, the information collection.
Event Analysis
Timeline of Events on 9/17/2015 1120 Condition discovered and subsequently corrected within approximately five (5) seconds 1133 Condition Report (CR-JAF-2015-04146) initiated.
1220 Short Term LCO Ent /Exit (Late Entry) — Secondary Containment momentarily inoperable
Cause
Secondary Containment access openings are equipped with green indicating lights that are lit when the opposing access opening door is fully shut. Both parties involved indicated they observed the green indicating light prior to opening the airlock door. Therefore, the cause of this condition was determined to be simultaneous opening of the doors.
Similar Events Internal Events No similar events were identified at JAF.
External events:
Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station: LER 2015-008, Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously Cause Loss of Secondary Containment.
Duane Arnold Energy Center: LER 2015-003-01, Both Doors in Secondary Containment Airlock Opened Concurrently.
Corrective Actions
Completed Actions
- Both airlock doors on the north Reactor Building 272 elevation Secondary Containment access opening were closed within approximately five (5) seconds.
- A prompt investigation was conducted, including interviews with all involved personnel.
Planned Actions
- Submittal of a License Amendment Request, Ref. TSTF-551, "Revise Secondary Containment Surveillance Requirements," which is currently under NRC review.
Safety Consequence and Implications Actual Consequences There were no actual consequences of this event relative to nuclear, industrial, or radiological safety.
Potential Consequences The Secondary Containment differential pressure remained more negative than 0.25 inches of water vacuum while this condition existed. Therefore, there are no potential consequences of this event relative to nuclear, industrial, or radiological safety.
eported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
end comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information lections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555- 1. or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of nformation and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget.
ashington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a rrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not squired to respond to, the information collection.
00 2015 — 004
References
- Condition Report: CR-JAF-2015-04146, September 17, 2015, Concurrent Opening of Secondary Containment Access Airlocks
- Technical Specifications