05000333/FIN-2015001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Incomplete Fuel Support Piece Seating Not Identified During Post-Refueling Core Verification |
| Description | A self-revealing, Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because the existence of a partially seated fuel support piece at reactor cell location 38-39 was not identified when FitzPatrick staff performed the procedure for reactor core verification at the conclusion of refueling operations during the 2014 refueling outage (RO21). Specifically, the fact that the four fuel assemblies associated with cell 38-39 were elevated by an estimated 1.5 inches above the top of the rest of the fuel assemblies in the reactor core was not identified during visual verification of fuel assembly seating performed after the conclusion of core alterations in accordance with procedure EN-RE-210, BWR [boiling water reactor] Reactor Core and MPC [multi-purpose canister] Cask Fuel Verification. As immediate corrective action, FitzPatrick staff engaged the fuel vendor, who provided an interim thermal limit penalty to be applied to the four affected fuel assemblies pending completion of a formal analysis. The issue was entered into FitzPatrick s CAP as CR-JAF- 2015-00789. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the fuel support piece not being completely fitted into the top of the control rod guide tube resulted in increased bypass flow around the cell 38-39 fuel assemblies, which reduced the margin to thermal limits for these assemblies during normal, transient, and accident conditions. Since the performance deficiency associated with the finding occurred during shutdown operations and also had potential safety significance during normal at-power operations, the inspectors screened the finding for significance using both IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, and IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the displaced fuel bundles did not have any negative impact on safety during shutdown conditions, and through application of a thermal limit penalty, did not negatively impact the safe operation of the reactor at power. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence, because FitzPatrick staff did not follow the procedure requirement for reactor core verification to verify that the tops of the fuel channels and bail handles were all at approximately the same height. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2015001 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Sienel E Burket E Knutson J Patel J Schoppy |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2015001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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