05000333/FIN-2014005-02
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | TS Actions for Inoperable ECCS Not Performed Within the TS Allowed Completion Time |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV for two violations of TS 3.5.1, ECCS [emergency core cooling systems] - Operating, associated with the non-functionality of east crescent area ventilation and cooling (CAVC) subsystem unit cooler 66UC-22H. Specifically, during the periods May 5 through May 21, 2010, and March 15 through March 25, 2011, the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) requirements for east crescent unit cooler operability were not satisfied for longer than the allowed outage time (AOT), which caused the ECCS in the east crescent to become inoperable and remain so for longer than the TS AOT without completion of the required plant mode changes. As immediate corrective action, Entergy personnel reconditioned the fan motor contactor for the affected unit cooler to obtain satisfactory low voltage pickup response. The issue was entered into Entergys CAP as CR-JAF-2012-00584 and CR-JAF-2012-02288. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the unsatisfactory low voltage response of the 66UC-22H fan motor contactor, along with the unavailability of another east CAVC unit cooler due to maintenance, could have degraded the capability of ECCS systems in the east crescent area during an accident concurrent with degraded voltage conditions. In light of FitzPatrick staffs determination that there was reasonable assurance that the remaining three operable unit coolers would have been capable o
removing required post-accident heat loads, the inspectors determined that the finding wa of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significanc Determination Process for Findings At-Power, because the performance deficiency was no a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent the actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS AOT, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or sever weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Proble Identification and Resolution, Resolution, because FitzPatrick staff did not take effectiv corrective actions to address the low voltage pickup issue in a timely manner commensurat with its safety significance [P.3]. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2014005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Pinson B Sienel E Knutson R Rolph |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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