05000333/FIN-2014005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Untimely 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of a Secondary Containment System Functional Failure |
| Description | Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified an SL IV NCV of Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the secondary containment system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, while restoring the normal reactor building ventilation (RBV) syste
to service following maintenance, reactor building-to-ambient differential pressure droppe below the Technical Specification (TS) required minimum value of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge and therefore caused the secondary containment system to be inoperable. However, FitzPatrick staff did not promptly recognize this as a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. As corrective action, FitzPatrick staff reported the condition to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and entered it into the corrective action progra (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2014-06498. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the secondary containment system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter. Using Example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
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| Report | IR 05000333/2014005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Pinson B Sienel E Knutson R Rolph |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.72 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Loss of Safety Function Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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