05000333/FIN-2014005-03
Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | TS 3.3.5.2, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation, requires that the RCIC system instrumentation for all 4 channels of low CST water level be operable while in Modes 1, 2, or 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than 150 psig. With any level switch inoperable, Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip. When this condition is not met, Condition E requires that RCIC be declared inoperable. LCO 3.5.3, RCIC System, further requires that RCIC be restored to operable status within 14 days or be placed in Mode 3. Contrary to TS 3.3.5.2, with two RCIC CST level switches, 13LS-76B and -77B, inoperable from July 16, 2013 to August 19, 2013, Entergy did not place the channels in trip or declare RCIC inoperable, or place the reactor in Mode 3 per TS 3.5.3. The cause o
the inoperability was corrosion buildup on the level switches caused by water intrusion through a junction box common to the switches. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-JAF-2013-04311. The inspectors determined, through a review of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not related to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a mitigating system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. The Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) used the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-On Evaluatio (SAPHIRE), Revision 8.1.2, and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model for Fitzpatrick, Model Version 8.1.17, to confirm that no loss of safety function occurred. The SRA determined that the RCIC pump suction is assumed to remain on the CST for the duration of operation to complete its safety function and therefore this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The CST inventory is modeled to be sufficient because the function of RCIC is to respond to transient events to provide makeup coolant to the reactor. |
Site: | FitzPatrick ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000333/2014005 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Pinson B Sienel E Knutson R Rolph |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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