With a
reactor building ventilation radiation monitor
inoperable,
TS 3.3.6.2 Condition A requires placing the associated
secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel in trip within
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If Condition A is not met, Condition C requires that the
reactor building ventilation system be isolated or the associated
secondary containment isolation valves be declared
inoperable, and that the
SGT system be placed in operation within one hour. Contrary to the above, at 7:40 a.m. on November 6, 2013, the A
reactor building ventilation radiation monitor was declared
inoperable for maintenance, but the associated
secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel was not placed in trip within
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the
reactor building ventilation system was not isolated, the associated
secondary containment isolation valves were not declared
inoperable, and the
SGT system was not placed in operation within one hour. The cause of this TS violation was human error. Entergy staff entered this issue into the
CAP as
CR-JAF-2013-05676. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, because the finding only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the
secondary containment.
