05000333/FIN-2010005-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Equipment Status Control for a Manually Operated Normally Locked Open Residual Heat Removal Injection Valve |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of very low safety significance of TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified because Entergy personnel did not implement AP-12.06, Equipment Status Control, as required. Specifically, Entergy personneldid not maintain status control and properly document the position of the residual heat removal (RHR) to reactor water recirculation loop B isolation valve (10RHR-818) as closed nor did operators restore the valve to its normal locked open position upon completion of a leak surveillance test. Entergy personnel entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), (CR-JAF-2010-06656) and promptly restored the valve to its required locked open position. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the operators did not maintain configuration control of the RHR isolation valve and restore the valve to a locked open position when the B RHR subsystem was credited for maintaining acceptable shutdown risk. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The issue was determined to screen as very low safety significance (Green) because the B RHR train could be considered available with respect to Appendix G, Section 4.0, and Attachment 3, Section 2,2.3. Specifically, the inspectors determined that operators had more than twice the time available (with a shortest time to boil of 5.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) than would have been required to identify and take action to restore/open the RHR isolation valve in the event of a loss of shutdown cooling or RCS inventory. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Work Practices component, because Entergy personnel did not define and effectively com m unicate expectations regard ing procedural compliance, and personnel did not follow procedures. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2010005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Rutenkroger D Jones J Noggle M Gray T Burns E Knutson R Latta D Dodson P Prescott |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2010005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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