05000333/FIN-2010005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Refueling Water Level Control Resulted in Overflowing of Reactor Cavity Water in the Reactor Building |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of very low safety significance of technical specification (TS) 5.4, Procedures, was identified because Entergy procedure OP-30A
Refueling Water Level Control, did not provide adequate guidance to operators for filling the reactor cavity which resulted in the reactor building (RB) floor drains overflowing and water intrusion from higher to lower levels in the RB. Entergy personnel entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), (CR-JAF-2010-05406 and CR-JAF-2010-05407) and performed several actions to ensure proper water level control prior to the next drain down of the reactor cavity. These actions included revising OP-30A to provide sufficient detail, ensuring additional detail would be included in pre-job briefings to include potential drain paths from the reactor cavity and spent fuel pool, and installing a dedicated camera to monitor reactor cavity water level. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, water spray throughout areas of the RB created a potential for water entering motors, valve operators, motor control centers, circuit breakers, and electricaljunction boxes, such that electrical components could have been compromised, which increased the likelihood of an event that would upset plant stability and challenge a critical safety function. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Phase 1. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because Entergy personnel maintained an adequate mitigation capability and there was there neither an inadvertent loss of two feet of RCS inventory nor an inadvertent reactor coolant system pressurization. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance within the resources component because the procedure used for filling the reactor cavity was not sufficiently complete to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2010005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Rutenkroger D Jones J Noggle M Gray T Burns E Knutson R Latta D Dodson P Prescott |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2010005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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