05000331/FIN-2012002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Lack of Acceptance Criteria within Emergency Core Cooling System Surveillance Procedure |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors on February 2, 2012, for the licensees failure to prescribe a procedure appropriate to the circumstances and include appropriate acceptance criteria in Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.5.1-15, RHR System Water Fill Test, Revision 1. Specifically, STP 3.5.1-15 did not provide guidance for quantifying the size of any voids within the system, such that the effect on system operability could not be readily evaluated, nor did the STP establish criteria for an acceptable as-found condition. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1731106 and initiated procedure revisions to provide appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors determined that failing to establish appropriate acceptance criteria for a Technical Specification (TS) surveillance procedure was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, having Corrective Action Program components, such that issues potentially affecting nuclear safety are promptly identified (at a low threshold), fully evaluated, and that actions are taken to address safety issues in a timely manner. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2012002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Orlikowski T Bilik M Mitchell M Ring L Haeg K Walton J Draper R Murray S Bell |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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