05000331/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Cancellation of River Survey Work Order Causes Inoperability of River Water Supply System |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed on August 11, 2011, when both river water supply subsystems were rendered inoperable following a sediment intrusion event. Specifically, the cause of the event was attributed to the cancellation of a river bed survey that would have identified the increased sediment buildup requiring increased monitoring and corrective actions (dredging, sand pumping, and/or structural repairs). The cancellation of the river bed survey work order was contrary to the requirements of Administrative Control Procedure 1208.3, Preventive Maintenance Program, that required management approval prior to cancelling the work order that was tied to the corrective action program. This issue of concern was documented in the licensees corrective action program as condition report 01676836. Corrective actions included revision to affected river survey work orders to ensure that they could not be cancelled without adequate review and approval, and completion of river dredging and repairs to the upstream spur dikes. The inspectors determined that the issue of concern represented a performance deficiency because it was the result of the licensees failure to meet a procedural requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available under the Initiating Events Cornerstone column of Table 4a, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, having Decision Making components, and involving the licensee making safety or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process, including formally defining the authority and roles for decisions affecting nuclear safety. Specifically, several decisions were made with respect to spur dike repairs and river monitoring; however, the requisite organizational reviews and approvals associated with the river were not performed to ensure appropriate actions were taken. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2011005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Orlikowski M Mitchell M Ring L Haeg R Murray J Beavers R Edwards |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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