05000324/FIN-2016003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Procedure to Perform Preventive Maintenance on the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Overload Relay |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1a, Procedures, was identified for the failure of the licensee to have an adequate procedure for preventive maintenance (PM) on the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) auxiliary oil pump motor overload relay 2-2XDA-B11-74. Specifically, from May 26, 2015, to July 6, 2016, the licensee failed to incorporate PM task 482688, a 12-year replacement task for the relays, into procedures, resulting in a shorted relay coil, the loss of control power, and the inoperability of the HPCI pump. The licensee replaced the relay and the HPCI pump was returned to operable. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as NCR 2043067. The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to have an adequate PM procedure to replace the Unit 2 HPCI auxiliary oil pump motor overload relay 2-2XDA-B11-74 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to replace the HPCI auxiliary oil pump motor overload relay resulted in the inoperability of the Unit 2 HPCI pump, and the loss of safety function. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, issued June 19, 2012, the SDP for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding screened to a more detailed risk evaluation, since the finding represented a loss of HPCI system and/or function. The inspectors used SAPHIRE to conduct a more detailed risk review of the finding. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the core damage frequency (CDF) risk was less than 1.0E-6/year. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work management aspect, for failing to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is an overriding priority. Specifically the licensee failed to effectively plan and coordinate PM strategies associated with operating experience to prevent the failure of the HPCI pump. |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
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| Report | IR 05000324/2016003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Dodson M Catts M Schwieg S Rose |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2016003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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