05000317/FIN-2013004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Post-Maintenance Test Associated with an Atmospheric Dump Valve |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specifications 5.4.1, Procedures, for the failure of Constellation Energy Nuclear Group (CENG) personnel to establish, implement, and maintain maintenance requirements associated with No. 21 atmospheric dump valve (ADV). Specifically, CENG personnel failed to perform an adequate postmaintenance test (PMT) in accordance with the work instructions for the No. 21 ADV following maintenance and prior to its return to service. As a result, the valve was returned to service in a condition where its containment isolation function was inoperable. Immediate corrective actions included entering this issue into the corrective action program (CAP). Additional corrective actions taken or planned include training Maintenance shop personnel on writing condition reports (CRs) for all failed PMTs and for Operations to ensure that work orders involving ADVs include post-maintenance operability tests for containment closure. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the No. 21 ADV was returned to service in a condition where its containment isolation function was inoperable. In addition, the finding is similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 5.b, in that, the system was returned to service prior to resolution of the degraded condition. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. Specifically, there was no loss of steam generator tube integrity. Also, the finding did not involve an actual reduction of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, CAP component, because CENG staff did not ensure that issues potentially impacting nuclear safety were promptly identified, fully evaluated, and that actions are taken to address safety issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, CENG staff did not implement a CAP with a low threshold for identifying issues such as writing a CR following the identification that the ADV was degraded. |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000317/2013004 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook B Fuller B Scrabeck D Schroeder E Torres G Callaway J Laughlin R Rolph S Kennedy S Pindale |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Calvert Cliffs)
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