05000317/FIN-2013003-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Inadequate Steam Generator Tube Rupture Emergency Operating Procedure |
Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.b, Procedures, because CENG failed to maintain guidance in Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR). Specifically, EOP-6 guidance does not provide an alternative action to cool down the reactor coolant system (RCS) for a SGTR event with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and the single failure of the unaffected steam generator (SG) atmospheric dump valve (ADV). This could result in the inability to terminate the primary to secondary leak into the affected SG and the cycling of the affected SG ADV to control the SG level resulting in additional dose to the public. Immediate corrective actions included entering this issue into their CAP. Corrective actions planned include revising EOP-6 to address the identified deficiency. In addition, CENG established interim administrative controls of the ADVs to ensure that appropriate remedial actions are taken if the ADVs are out of service and is evaluating adding the ADVs to their technical specifications. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, RCS, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the performance deficiency could result in the operation of the affected SG ADV and, consequently, the release of radioactivity to the environment until an adequate method to cool down the RCS is established. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. Also, the finding did not involve an actual reduction of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because CENG did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, CENG did not ensure that EOP-6 was complete, accurate, and up-to-date through required periodic reviews. |
Site: | Calvert Cliffs |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000317/2013003 Section 1R04 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Laughlin R Rolph S Kennedy S Pindale D Schroeder E Burket E Torres J Furia |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
' | |
Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2013003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Calvert Cliffs)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||