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CATEGORY 1y REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RXDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9806100440 DOC.DATE: 98/06/05 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M
05000315 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHOEPF,P.
American Electric Power Co., Inc.
SAMPSON,J.R.
~
American Electric Power Co., 'Inc.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 98-007-01:on 980211,ice condense4r weights us to determine TS compliance not representative,was determined.
Caused by mgt methods.Xce condensers for both units will be melted out 8 reloaded w/fresh ice.W/980605. ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
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'G RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RAB NTER R D EEL'B NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.
NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME STANG, J AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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'N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)
ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 24 ENCL 24
American Electric P~
Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgman, MI49106 616465590t AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER June 5, 1998 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager:
d i
1 i
li h dby FR
.73 ildpi 8hfll i
p i
i i<<d:
98-007-01 Sincerely, J. R. Sampson Site Vice President
/mbd Attachment C. J.
Paperiello (Acting), Region III J. R.
Sampson P. A.
Barrett S. J.
Brewer R.
Whale D.
Hahn Records Center, INPO NRC Resident Inspector 9806i00440
'PSGb05 PDR ADQCK 05000MS 8
PDR
NRC FORM 366 (5-92)
AS.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)'PROVED BY OMB No. 3150 0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
To COMPLY WITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORWAR COHMEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TM IHFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR.
REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE 0
MAHAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 50-315 Page1 of6 TITLE (4) lce Condenser Weights Used to Determine Technical Specification Compliance Not Representative EVEHT DATE 5
LER NUMBER 6
REPORT DATE 7
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8
MONTH 02 DAY YEAR YEAR 11 98 98 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 007 REVISION NUMBER 01 HONTH DAY 06 05 YEAR 98 FACILITY NAME Cook-Unlt2 FACILITY HAME DOCKET NUMBER 50-316 DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING MODE (9)
POWER LEVEL (10) 00 TH S
REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR Check one or moro 11 20.2201(b) 20.2203 a
1 20.2203(a)(2)(I) 20.2203 a
2 ii 20'203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73 a
2 iv 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73 a
2 vii 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)
- 73. 71o OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text,20.2203(a)(3)(I) 20.2203 a
3 ii 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36 c 1
50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(I)
)(
50.73(a)(2)(II)
LICENSEE CON'TACT FOR THIS LER 12 HAME Mr. Paul Schoepf, Mechanical Systems Manager COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FA TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code) 616/465-5901, x2408 HIS REPORT 13 LURE DESCRIBED IN T
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
CAUSE
SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO HPRDS SUPPLEMEHTAL REPORI'XPECTED 14 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).
X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.o., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On February 11, 1988, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 5, it was determined that the Ice Condenser ice basket weights used to determine compliance with Technical Specifications may not constitute a representative sample.
The Ice Condenser absorbs thermal energy released during a coolant leak inside Containment to limitthe peak pressure, and consists of 1944 ice baskets each filled with a required minimum of 1333 pounds of borated ice. The inability to select a representative sample of ice baskets for weighing may result in a maldistribution of ice that could have impacted the ability ofthe Ice Condenser to perform its function. The condition was determined reportable under 10CFR50.72 (b) (2) (i), and an ENS notification was made at 1618 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.15649e-4 months <br /> on February 11, 1988. This LER is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) for an unanalyzed condition.
The cause of this event is classified as management methods, which resulted in ineffective management of the Ice Condenser system, written communications resulting in inadequate surveillance procedures, and the use of inadequate software programs.
To correct any potential maldistribution of ice, the Ice Condensers for both units willbe melted out and reloaded with fresh ice.
The basis of the Ice Condenser surveillance program willbe reconstituted.
The software used to support the Ice Condenser surveillance program willeither be revised or replaced.
Responsibilities for the Ice Condenser system surveillance program will be reassigned concurrently to Engineering and Maintenance.
The safety significance of this condition was assessed.
The assessment concluded that the ice mass contained in the Ice Condenser as a whole was in excess of the amount used in the long term containment analysis, and that the containment pressure would have remained below the design pressure value of 12 psig. Therefore, this condition was of minimal safety significance.
NRC FORH 366A'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PPROVED BY OMB HO. 3'150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ESTIHATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WITH THI INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORWAR COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TH INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104),
OFFICE 0
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
'WASHINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 1
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 2
50-315 LER NUMBER 6
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 98 007
01 PAGE 3
2 OF 6 TEXT (ir cere space is required.
use additional HRC rom 3664's)
(17)
Co dltio s Prior o Occurrence Unit 1 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown The Ice Condenser is a safety-related system whose primary function is the absorption of thermal energy released abruptly in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Steam Line break (MSLB) inside Containment, for the purpose of limiting the initial peak pressure in the Containment. The system consists of a completely enclosed annular compartment located around approximately 300 degrees of the perimeter of the Containment. The main part of the Ice Condenser is a mass of sodium tetraborate ice stored inside the compartment. The sodium tetraborate solution produced by a partial melt<own of the ice absorbs and retains iodine released during the accident and serves as a heat transfer medium and neutron poison for reactivity control following the postulated design basis incident (LOCA). The total ice mass provides sufficient heat removal capability to condense the reactor coolant system volume released during a LOCA or a MSLB event. The Ice Condenser plays no role in the normal operation of the plant.
Accomplishment of the function of the Ice Condenser system is dependent upon the quantity and distribution of the ice mass within the Ice Condenser.
The ice mass is contained within an array of 1944 ice baskets.
Eighty-one ice baskets, arranged in a 9 by 9 grid, are located in each of the 24 bays of the Ice Condenser.
The ice baskets are 48
. feet tall with an approximate diameter of 12 inches.
The vertical portion of the basket is substantially open to accommodate heat transfer.
The Technical Specification (T/S) ice bed weight surveillance provides assurance that the required ice inventory will be resident in an adequate distribution in the Ice Condenser.
The surveillance is accomplished through a statistical analysis of a representative sample of individual ice basket weights in lieu of a 100 percent ice basket weight surveillance.
During the investigation of this condition, plant personnel determined that the requirements of T/S surveillance 4.6.5.1.b.2 were not being met. The surveillance requirement states, in part, that the operability of the Ice Condenser shall be verified at least once per 18 months by:
Weighing a representative sample of at least 144 ice baskets and verifying each basket contains at least 1333 pounds of ice. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of the 24 Ice.Condenser bays and shall be constituted of one basket each from Radial Rows 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 (or from the same row of an adjacent bay ifa basket from a designated row cannot be obtained for weighing) within each bay.
Ifany basket iffound to contain less than 1333 pounds of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed. The minimum average weight of the ice from'the 20 additional baskets and the discrepant basket shall not be less than 1333 pounds per basket at a 95 percent level of confidence.
Contrary to T/S requirements, the surveillance performed to verify operability of the Ice Condenser did not ensure that a representative sample of ice baskets were selected.
Compliance with the T/S requirements had previously been demonstrated by a statistical analysis of sample ice basket weights which were considered representative, even though some baskets are unweighable as acknowledged by both the Technical Specifications and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Visual surveys of ice baskets indicate that some baskets in both units, piedominantly in radial rows 9, but also radial row 8 and azimuthal row 5, show greater than expected ice loss due to sublimation.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB HO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY MITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORHAR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TH INFORHATIOH AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, HASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERMOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE 0
HAHAGEMENT AHD BUDGET IJASHIHGTOH DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 1
DOCKET NUMBER 2
YEAR LER NUMBER 6
SEQUENT IAL REVISION PAGE 3
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 50-315 98 007 01 3 OF 6 TEXT (if more space is required.
use additional HRC Fons 366A's) (17)
Descr io of Eve t cont'd The investigation revealed that implementation of the ice bed weight surveillance is accomplished by "*12 EHP 4030.STP.211, "Ice Condenser Surveillance". The guidance provided in this procedure deals mainly with the physical work methods to be used for ice basket weighing and maintenance activities. The procedure does not provide guidance on the selection of baskets to be weighed or on the statistical analysis of the data.
During performance of this suweillance, random selection of the initial 144 ice baskets to be weighed and the subsequent statistical analysis is accomplished by two separate computer programs.
Neither software program is referenced in the surveillance procedure.
ICEPICK, a computer software random number generator, is utilized to pick the initial 144 ice basket sample.
The minimum 144 ice basket sample is required to be expanded for 20 additional ice baskets for each ice basket determined to be below the T/S average weight. The expanded sample is performed in the same bay as the discrepant basket and is considered to be representative of the discrepant ice baskets.
The 20 additional baskets, however, are selected by the lead test engineer, as ICEPICK has no capability to perform the sample expansion of 20 additional ice baskets.
Statistical analysis of the individual ice basket weight data is performed using the NSLICE software program.
Input for NSLICE is from data gathered from the weighing of ice baskets in accordance with **12 EHP 4030.STP.211.
The data represents weights collected during the as-found weighing, the after mass addition weighing, and the as left weighing. No procedural guidance is provided for the input of data, or the use of the output tables from the NSLICE program.
The output tables depict individual ice basket ice mass, average ice mass for individual radial rows, each bay within the ice bed, each row-group average, and for the total ice bed mass at the 95% confidence factor.
NSLICE was developed by AEP early in the plant's life, but has never been updated to keep pace with changing requirements. The as-found weighing program and the expanded weighing program have evolved as advances in weighing methods have occurred, and the original ice weight surveillance practices and the bases of the statistical analysis depicted in the NSLICE program were closely aligned. As a result of changes in T/S requirements and related changes to ice basket mass maintenance and surveiliance practices, the statistical analyses did not remain aligned with the requirements and practices.
The current T/S surveillance requirements for the ice basket weights evolved from a requirement to weigh a sample of 60 baskets to a requirement to weigh 96 representative baskets due to weighing results which indicated non-uniform sublimation rates in the Ice Condenser.
The 96 sample weights were to be collected from radial rows 2, 4, 6 and 8 in each of the 24 bays.
During the early weighing program, attempts at weighing the baskets in radial rows 1 and 9, the wall baskets, proved unsuccessful.
Later, improvements in weighing methods resulted in the acquisition of wall basket ice weights.
Evaluation of this additional data revealed that the adjacent radial row ice basket weights were not representative of the wall ice basket weights due to sublimation. This resulted in radial rows 1 and 9 sample ice weights being added to the T/S surveillance.
This change resulted in the ice basket weighing program requirements embodied in the current requirements of T/S 4.6.5.1.b.2.
The T/S surveillance provides for the selection of alternate ice baskets ifthe initiallyselected basket is determined to be unweighable.
An alternate representative ice basket can be selected from the same radial row within the same bay or within an adjacent bay. The use of alternate ice baskets was added to T/S 4.6.5.1.b.2 with Amendment 18, and has been frequently exercised.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION PPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY IIITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~
FORIIAR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO TH INFORMATION AND RECORDS HANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, IIASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERNOR REDUCTION PROJECT-(3150-0104),
OFFICE 0
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 1
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 2
50-315 YEAR 98 LER NUMBER 6
SEQUENTIAL REVISION 007
01 PAGE 3
4 OF 6 TEXT (if sere space is required.
use additional HRC Fom 366A's) (17)
Descri tio of Even cont'd The current typical Ice Condenser weighing program would start by attempting to weigh the 144 ice baskets selected by ICEPICK. Initiallyselected individual ice baskets deemed to be unweighable during the weighing process would have alternates selected from the same radial row in the same bay or an adjacent bay. The condition of the ice baskets often resulted in numerous attempts being made to obtain the weight of individual ice baskets.
In the radial rows adjacent to the crane wall, principally radial rows 9 and 8, the majority of the ice baskets were considered to be unweighable in the recent past, due to being frozen and/or damaged.
The unweighable status of these ice baskets combined with the use of alternate baskets frequently resulted in the weight from the same ice baskets being utilized in the statistical analysis of successive weighing programs.
The as-found weighing program was considered to be successfully completed once the minimum 144 ice baskets plus the required expansion had been completed with the row', bay, row group and total Ice Condenser averages above the specified minimum.
No consideration was given to collecting or utilizing representative samples of ice basket weights.
Ifthe average of any one row and/or group were below the specified minimum, additional samples would be collected in an attempt to increase the average weight of the ice baskets.
Weighing activities would subsequently be expanded to include attempting to weigh all ice baskets with the exception of those baskets with physical interferences from the intermediate deck. The as-found weighing program and the expanded weighing program would be performed concurrently with all individual ice basket weights being input into the same NSLICE data set.
STP.211 provides a maximum allowable gross weight for an individual ice basket.
The maximum allowable weight of the basket plus the contained ice was derived from the structural analysis of the Ice Condenser system.
STP.211 did not provide a minimum allowable ice mass for an individual ice basket.
Allacceptance criteria contained in STP.211 associated with minimum ice mass was based upon the statistically derived averages of all weighed ice baskets.
The number of baskets being emptied and refilled has steadily decreased since the late 1980 early 1990 time period. The emptying and refilling of individual ice baskets beyond those baskets individually demonstrated to be below the T/S minimum average ice mass was gradually eliminated from the scope ofwork performed during an Ice Condenser maintenance outage.
The acceptance criteria was considered to be the averages of the various groupings as stated in Technical Specifications.
The use of the various averages as the sole ice mass acceptance criteria included sample expansion until the average was determined to be above minimum Technical Specification acceptance criteria with no additional individual weights being collected. These additional, unweighed ice baskets had not been demonstrated to be outside the T/S acceptance criteria, and therefore were considered to be expanded scope.
Work items classified as expanded outage scope were typically not performed due to budget and schedule constraints.
The 'expanded scope'eletions effectively eliminated all unweighed ice baskets from ice mass maintenance activities.
During the most recent outages, this philosophy had progressed to the point of not
- - performing ice mass addition activities to individual baskets which had been demonstrated to be below the Technical Specification weight limit. The decision to exclude fillinglow weight baskets was partially justified based upon using the criteria ofvarious averages being above the T/S weight limit.
NRC FORH 366A'UCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION PPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ESTIHATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COHPLY MITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.,
FORNAR COHHEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TH INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERIIOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE 0
MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET MASNINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 1
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 2
50-315 LER NUMBER 6
YEAR SEQUEHT IAL REVISION 98
007
01 PAGE 3
5 OF 6 TEXT (if acre space is required.
use additional HRC Fons 366A's) (17)
The cause of this event is classified as management methods, resulting in ineffective management of the Ice Condenser system.
The responsibilities related to the Ice Condenser system design basis, surveillance, and maintenance were fragmented.
A contributing cause was written communications, which resulted in poorly documented, inadequately accessible, and, therefore, poorly understood surveillance bases.
Fragmentation of the responsibilities for the Ice Condenser system compounded the consequences of poor written communications.
Another contributing cause was the use of inadequate software programs, NSLICE and ICEPICK.
The condition was determined to represent an unanalyzed condition, and in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)
'n ENS notification was made.
Additionally, the condition resulted in not meeting the requirements of Technical Specification 4.6.5.1.b.2 in that a representative sample of ice basket weights was not obtained.
This LER is
, therefore submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) for any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications, and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) for an unanalyzed condition.
The safety significance of this condition was assessed by Westinghouse.
The assessment concluded that the ice mass contained in the Ice Condenser as a whole was in excess of the amount used in the long term containment analysis, and that containment pressure would have remained below the design basis value. Therefore, any potential maldistribution of ice, which may not have been discovered due to the failure to identify and filllow weight ice baskets from NSLICE program output, was determined to be of minimal safety significance.
To correct any potential maldistribution of ice, the Ice Condensers for both units willbe melted out and reloaded with fresh ice. The melt out of Unit 1 is complete, and the production of fresh ice is in progress.
The melt out of Unit 2 willcommence in the near future.
The basis of the Ice Condenser surveillance program willbe reconstituted and incorporated into the Design Basis Documents.
Utilizing the reconstituted surveillance basis, all Ice Condenser surveillance procedures willeither be revised or completely rewritten. As part of the reconstitution process, the surveillance methodology as well as the selection and acceptance criteria for individual ice basket and various basket groupings will be reviewed for compliance with both the T/S and the analytical basis of the Ice Condenser system.
The software used to support the Ice Condenser surveillance program willeither be revised or replaced.
The selection process for all ice baskets to be weighed willbe established and incorporated into procedures, as well as the acceptance criteria for individual baskets and basket groupings.
A comprehensive assessment of the plant surveillance program is being performed as part of the Restart Plan.
This assessment willbe completed prior to restart of either unit. Specific actions that arise from this assessment willbe communicated to the NRC during the restart process.
NRC FORH 366A.
HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION PPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COHPLY liITH THI INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORFAR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO TH INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS MAHAGEMENT BRANCH (HHB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH, llASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104),
OFFICE 0
MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET liASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME 1
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 2
50-315 YEAR 98 LER NUMBER 6
SEQUENTIAL 007 REVISION 01 PAGE 3
6OF6 TEXT (if cere space is required.
use additional NRC Fona 366A's) (17)
Corre ive Actions cont'd To address the ineffective management methods for the Ice Condenser system, the surveillance requirements for the Ice Condenser willbe shared by both the Engineering and Maintenance organizations.
The Maintenance organization willbe principally responsible for implementation of surveillance and maintenance requirements, including supervision of the labor force. The shiit of the direct supervisory oversight of the surveillance labor force to the maintenance organization will permit the engineering staff to focus on adequate translation and maintenance of the design bases requirements of the Ice Condenser system.
As a portion of the regeneration of the surveillance procedures, the surveillance methodology as well as the selection and acceptance criteria for individual ice baskets willbe reviewed for compliance with both the T/S and the analytical bases of the Ice Condenser system.
Fa led Com onent Identification Not applicable.
Previous Similar Even s 316/86-011-01
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| 05000315/LER-1998-001, :on 980104,containment Air Recirculation Sys Flow Testing Results Indicated Condition Outside Design Basis.Caused by Mispositioned Valve Actuator.Corrected Actuator to Valve Orientation |
- on 980104,containment Air Recirculation Sys Flow Testing Results Indicated Condition Outside Design Basis.Caused by Mispositioned Valve Actuator.Corrected Actuator to Valve Orientation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-002, :on 980108,discovered Several Broken Master Relay (MR) Covers Inside Ssps Logic Cabinet.Caused by Past Practice of Removing MR Covers to Perform Time Response Testing.Replaced All Unnacceptable Ssps MRs |
- on 980108,discovered Several Broken Master Relay (MR) Covers Inside Ssps Logic Cabinet.Caused by Past Practice of Removing MR Covers to Perform Time Response Testing.Replaced All Unnacceptable Ssps MRs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000316/LER-1998-002-01, :on 980224,determined That PORV Inoperability Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis.Caused by Communication Failure.Procedures Revised |
- on 980224,determined That PORV Inoperability Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis.Caused by Communication Failure.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000316/LER-1998-003, :on 980304,two Pressurizer Safety Valves Failed to Lift within Setpoint Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Valves Were Retested & Adjustments Were Made to Lower Setpoints |
- on 980304,two Pressurizer Safety Valves Failed to Lift within Setpoint Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Valves Were Retested & Adjustments Were Made to Lower Setpoints
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-003, :on 980107,missed Procedure Step Resulted in Esfa & RPS Actuation Occurring.Caused by Personnel Error. Work on Ssps Stopped & High Priority Job Order Initiated to Restore Ssps to Normal |
- on 980107,missed Procedure Step Resulted in Esfa & RPS Actuation Occurring.Caused by Personnel Error. Work on Ssps Stopped & High Priority Job Order Initiated to Restore Ssps to Normal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1998-004-01, :on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made |
- on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000316/LER-1998-004, :on 980319,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Was Potentially in Excess of Design Basis Limit.Caused by Lack of Understanding.Known Degraded Conditions Resulting in Divider Barrier Pass Being Corrected |
- on 980319,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Was Potentially in Excess of Design Basis Limit.Caused by Lack of Understanding.Known Degraded Conditions Resulting in Divider Barrier Pass Being Corrected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-004, :on 980122,discovered That One of Ice Condenser Flow Passages Contained Large Amount of Frost & Ice.Caused by Inadequate Maint & Surveillance Practices.Completed Detailed Mapping & Quantification of Flow Passage Blockage |
- on 980122,discovered That One of Ice Condenser Flow Passages Contained Large Amount of Frost & Ice.Caused by Inadequate Maint & Surveillance Practices.Completed Detailed Mapping & Quantification of Flow Passage Blockage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-004-02, Forwards LER 98-004-02,providing Results of Analyses Performed by W.Ler Is Being Reduced from 7 Pages to 6 Due to Transferring Details of Root Cause Section to Cause of Event, Section | Forwards LER 98-004-02,providing Results of Analyses Performed by W.Ler Is Being Reduced from 7 Pages to 6 Due to Transferring Details of Root Cause Section to Cause of Event, Section | | | 05000315/LER-1998-005, :on 980122,missing Screws from Ice Condenser Ice Basket Coupling Rings Resulted in Potentially Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Failure in Shear Due to Overload During Basket Weighing Process.Melted Out Condensers |
- on 980122,missing Screws from Ice Condenser Ice Basket Coupling Rings Resulted in Potentially Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Failure in Shear Due to Overload During Basket Weighing Process.Melted Out Condensers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000316/LER-1998-005-01, :on 980715,potential for HELB to Degrade Component Cooling Water Sys Was Noted.Investigation & Analysis of Signficance of Event Is Continuing.Method May Be Developed to Protect CCW Pump Area |
- on 980715,potential for HELB to Degrade Component Cooling Water Sys Was Noted.Investigation & Analysis of Signficance of Event Is Continuing.Method May Be Developed to Protect CCW Pump Area
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-006, :on 980225,ice Basket Weighing Option Resulted in Potential Unanalyzed Condition Due to Lack of Technical Basis for Option.Caused by Failure to Maintain Design Basis for Ice Condenser.Revised Plant Procedure |
- on 980225,ice Basket Weighing Option Resulted in Potential Unanalyzed Condition Due to Lack of Technical Basis for Option.Caused by Failure to Maintain Design Basis for Ice Condenser.Revised Plant Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(b)(2)(ii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-007, :on 980211,ice Condenser Weights Used to Determine TS Compliance Were Not Representative.Caused by Mgt Methods.Ice Condensers for Both Units Will Be Melted Out & Reloaded W/Fresh Ice |
- on 980211,ice Condenser Weights Used to Determine TS Compliance Were Not Representative.Caused by Mgt Methods.Ice Condensers for Both Units Will Be Melted Out & Reloaded W/Fresh Ice
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1998-007-01, :on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With |
- on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1998-008, :on 980112,inadequate Contractor Control During Maint & Surveillance Activities Resulted in Ice Basket Damage.Procedures Used to Guide Maint & Surveillance Activities Have Been Upgraded & Rewritten |
- on 980112,inadequate Contractor Control During Maint & Surveillance Activities Resulted in Ice Basket Damage.Procedures Used to Guide Maint & Surveillance Activities Have Been Upgraded & Rewritten
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000316/LER-1998-008, :on 980112,damaged Ice Condenser Ice Basket Removed from Unit 1 Ice Condenser.Caused by Inadequate Control of Contractors & Inappropriate Maint.Damage Beyond Threshold Will Be Repaired & Replaced |
- on 980112,damaged Ice Condenser Ice Basket Removed from Unit 1 Ice Condenser.Caused by Inadequate Control of Contractors & Inappropriate Maint.Damage Beyond Threshold Will Be Repaired & Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000315/LER-1998-009, :on 980217,HR SR Not Being Met Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedure.Procedures Revised |
- on 980217,HR SR Not Being Met Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedure.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000315/LER-1998-010, :on 980303,ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Structural Discrepancies Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Removed All Intermediate Deck Door Frames & Support Beams & Reassembling Parts |
- on 980303,ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Structural Discrepancies Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Removed All Intermediate Deck Door Frames & Support Beams & Reassembling Parts
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-011, :on 980305,steel Containment Liner Pitting Was Is Excess of Design.Caused by Lack of Procedural Controls. Seals Were Removed,Containment Liner Plate Was Prepared & Coated & New Seals Applied |
- on 980305,steel Containment Liner Pitting Was Is Excess of Design.Caused by Lack of Procedural Controls. Seals Were Removed,Containment Liner Plate Was Prepared & Coated & New Seals Applied
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-012, :on 980305,discovered That 1/4 Inch Particulate Retention Requirement Had Not Been Maintained in Containment Recirculation Pump.Caused by Incompleted Design Change.Will Correct Condition Under New Design Change |
- on 980305,discovered That 1/4 Inch Particulate Retention Requirement Had Not Been Maintained in Containment Recirculation Pump.Caused by Incompleted Design Change.Will Correct Condition Under New Design Change
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-013, :on 980306,improper Splice Configurations for Power Operated Relief Valve Limit Switches Resulted in Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Guidance in Installation Documents.Evaluation Performed |
- on 980306,improper Splice Configurations for Power Operated Relief Valve Limit Switches Resulted in Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Guidance in Installation Documents.Evaluation Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-014, :on 980310,determined That Plant Had Operated in Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W Re Assumptions Used in Safety Analysis.Will Revise Functional Restoration Procedure FRZ-1.With |
- on 980310,determined That Plant Had Operated in Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W Re Assumptions Used in Safety Analysis.Will Revise Functional Restoration Procedure FRZ-1.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000315/LER-1998-014-03, Forwards LER 98-014-03, Response to High-High Containment Pressure Procedure Not Consistent with Analysis of Record. Revised Info Marked by Sidebars in Right Hand Margin. Commitments Made by Util,Listed | Forwards LER 98-014-03, Response to High-High Containment Pressure Procedure Not Consistent with Analysis of Record. Revised Info Marked by Sidebars in Right Hand Margin. Commitments Made by Util,Listed | | | 05000315/LER-1998-015, :on 980312,ice Weight Requirements Potentially Were Not Met Due to Nonconservative Assumption in Software Program.Update to Interim LER Will Be Issued by 980513 |
- on 980312,ice Weight Requirements Potentially Were Not Met Due to Nonconservative Assumption in Software Program.Update to Interim LER Will Be Issued by 980513
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1998-016, :on 980323,re non-safety Related Cables Routed to Safety Related Equipment.Lers 98-016-00 & 98-016-01 Retracted |
- on 980323,re non-safety Related Cables Routed to Safety Related Equipment.Lers 98-016-00 & 98-016-01 Retracted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-017, :on 980327,debris Was Found in Sample Ice from Ice Condenser Sys.Caused by Poor Work Practices.Ice Condenser Has Been Completely Thawed & Inspection,Repair & Refurbishment Activities Have Begun |
- on 980327,debris Was Found in Sample Ice from Ice Condenser Sys.Caused by Poor Work Practices.Ice Condenser Has Been Completely Thawed & Inspection,Repair & Refurbishment Activities Have Begun
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-018, :on 980505,use of RCP Seals as Alternate Boron Injection Flow Path Resulted in Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Maintaining Temp Above Recommended Max Temp.Westinghouse Has Provided Technical Input on Issue |
- on 980505,use of RCP Seals as Alternate Boron Injection Flow Path Resulted in Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Maintaining Temp Above Recommended Max Temp.Westinghouse Has Provided Technical Input on Issue
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-019-02, Forwards LER 98-019-02,which Provides Plant Test Data Gathered to Determine Error Associated W/Electric H Recombiner Temp Measurement Circuits.Changes to LER Are Marked W/Sidebar | Forwards LER 98-019-02,which Provides Plant Test Data Gathered to Determine Error Associated W/Electric H Recombiner Temp Measurement Circuits.Changes to LER Are Marked W/Sidebar | | | 05000315/LER-1998-019, :on 980320,determined That Electric Hydrogen Recombiner TS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2.b.1 Was Not Met.Caused by Design Deficiency Due to Inadequate Design Change Mgt.Revised Procedures |
- on 980320,determined That Electric Hydrogen Recombiner TS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.4.2.b.1 Was Not Met.Caused by Design Deficiency Due to Inadequate Design Change Mgt.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-020, :on 980408,noted Failure to Include Sodium Hydroxide in W Border Computer Program Used to Determine Ph in Containment Sump.Cause Indeterminate.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 981001 |
- on 980408,noted Failure to Include Sodium Hydroxide in W Border Computer Program Used to Determine Ph in Containment Sump.Cause Indeterminate.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 981001
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-021, :on 980311,determined That Oil Pans Not Installed on RCP Motors Resulted in App R Noncompliance. Caused by Failure to Fully Implement App R Requirements.Will Updgrade Oil Leak Collection Sys |
- on 980311,determined That Oil Pans Not Installed on RCP Motors Resulted in App R Noncompliance. Caused by Failure to Fully Implement App R Requirements.Will Updgrade Oil Leak Collection Sys
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-022, :on 980415,postulated Failure of SAT N Regulator Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate SE for Procedure rev.10CFR50.59 Program Has Been Upgraded to Meet Current Industry Standards.With |
- on 980415,postulated Failure of SAT N Regulator Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate SE for Procedure rev.10CFR50.59 Program Has Been Upgraded to Meet Current Industry Standards.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-023, :on 980416,potential Failure Due to Cross Train Routing of non-safety Related Cables Was Noted.Ler 98-023-00 & 98-023-01,retracted |
- on 980416,potential Failure Due to Cross Train Routing of non-safety Related Cables Was Noted.Ler 98-023-00 & 98-023-01,retracted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-024, :on 980417,allegation Concerning Accuracy of Ice Basket Weights Occurred.Allegation Has Been Investigated & Results of Investigation Will Be Provided to NRC by 980522 |
- on 980417,allegation Concerning Accuracy of Ice Basket Weights Occurred.Allegation Has Been Investigated & Results of Investigation Will Be Provided to NRC by 980522
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-025, :on 980424,plant Personnel Determined That Surveillance Requirements of Tech Specs 4.6.5.1.b.3 Were Not Met.Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Procedures Revised |
- on 980424,plant Personnel Determined That Surveillance Requirements of Tech Specs 4.6.5.1.b.3 Were Not Met.Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-026, :on 980430,TS SR 4.6.5.1.b.2 Was Not Met.Caused by Failure to Accurately Transfer SR Into Plant Procedures. Software Used to Support Ice Condenser Surveillance Program Will Either Be Revised or Replaced |
- on 980430,TS SR 4.6.5.1.b.2 Was Not Met.Caused by Failure to Accurately Transfer SR Into Plant Procedures. Software Used to Support Ice Condenser Surveillance Program Will Either Be Revised or Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000315/LER-1998-027, :on 980505,discovered Debris of Unknown Origin in West Containment Spray Header.Cause Indeterminate. Evaluation of Condition in Progress & Updated LER Will Be Submitted |
- on 980505,discovered Debris of Unknown Origin in West Containment Spray Header.Cause Indeterminate. Evaluation of Condition in Progress & Updated LER Will Be Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-028, :on 980513,determined That TS Surveillance Requirements Not Met Due to Lack of Understanding of Staggered Test Basis. Caused by Lack of Specific Training. Periodic Change of Nuclear Plant Maint Sys |
- on 980513,determined That TS Surveillance Requirements Not Met Due to Lack of Understanding of Staggered Test Basis. Caused by Lack of Specific Training. Periodic Change of Nuclear Plant Maint Sys
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1998-029, :on 980422,SFP Ventilation Sys Was Noted Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency.Safety Evaluation Successfully Performed & Appropriate Surveillance Testing Completed |
- on 980422,SFP Ventilation Sys Was Noted Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency.Safety Evaluation Successfully Performed & Appropriate Surveillance Testing Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-029-01, Forwards LER 98-029-01, Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Inoperable Due to Original Design Deficiency. Supplemental Rept Represents Extensive Rev to Original LER & Replaces Rept in Entirely.Commitment Listed | Forwards LER 98-029-01, Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Inoperable Due to Original Design Deficiency. Supplemental Rept Represents Extensive Rev to Original LER & Replaces Rept in Entirely.Commitment Listed | | | 05000315/LER-1998-030, Re Incorrect Installation of Containment Spray Heat Exchanger.Ler 98-030-00 Retracted. with | Re Incorrect Installation of Containment Spray Heat Exchanger.Ler 98-030-00 Retracted. with | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-031, :on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing |
- on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-031-01, Forwards LER 98-031-01,re Potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Due to Use of Inaccurate Values.Commitment Made by Util,Listed | Forwards LER 98-031-01,re Potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Due to Use of Inaccurate Values.Commitment Made by Util,Listed | | | 05000315/LER-1998-032, Forwards LER 98-032-00,originally Due on 980723.Additional Seven Days to Submit LER Was Granted by B Burgess of Region III | Forwards LER 98-032-00,originally Due on 980723.Additional Seven Days to Submit LER Was Granted by B Burgess of Region III | 10 CFR 21.21(c)(3)(ii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-033, :on 980611,H Recombiner Wattmeter Circuit TS SR Was Not Met.Caused by Inadequate TS SR Work Practices. Lessons Learned Document Was Issued to All Maint Personnel Involved W/Writing Surveillance Procedures |
- on 980611,H Recombiner Wattmeter Circuit TS SR Was Not Met.Caused by Inadequate TS SR Work Practices. Lessons Learned Document Was Issued to All Maint Personnel Involved W/Writing Surveillance Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1998-034, :on 980623,flow Rates to Containment Spray Headers Were Potentially Lower than Design Basis Values. Declared Containment Spray Sys,Inoperable.Update Will Be Submitted by 981015 |
- on 980623,flow Rates to Containment Spray Headers Were Potentially Lower than Design Basis Values. Declared Containment Spray Sys,Inoperable.Update Will Be Submitted by 981015
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-035, :on 980702,identified That Potentially Impacted Ability of Shock Absorbing Bumpers to Perform Intended Functions.Caused by Poor Work Practices.Bumpers Will Be Replaced by Newer Design Shock Absorber |
- on 980702,identified That Potentially Impacted Ability of Shock Absorbing Bumpers to Perform Intended Functions.Caused by Poor Work Practices.Bumpers Will Be Replaced by Newer Design Shock Absorber
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-036, :on 980723,discovered That Flow Indicator Had Not Been Calibr at TS Required Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Action Request Has Been Written to Calibr Component on Refueling Outage Basis |
- on 980723,discovered That Flow Indicator Had Not Been Calibr at TS Required Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Action Request Has Been Written to Calibr Component on Refueling Outage Basis
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000315/LER-1998-037-01, Forwards LER 98-037-01,representing Extensive Rev to Original LER & Replacing Rept in Entirety.Listed Commitments Identified in Submittal | Forwards LER 98-037-01,representing Extensive Rev to Original LER & Replacing Rept in Entirety.Listed Commitments Identified in Submittal | | | 05000315/LER-1998-037, :on 980812,ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit of 5 Square Feet Occurred.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design Basis of Containment as Sys. Procedure Will Be Developed to Guide Insp.With |
- on 980812,ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit of 5 Square Feet Occurred.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design Basis of Containment as Sys. Procedure Will Be Developed to Guide Insp.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
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