Similar Documents at Salem |
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LER-2004-005, Regarding Auto Safety Injection Signal Not Unblocked Prior to Mode Change from 5 to 4 |
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10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 3112004005R00 - NRC Website |
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PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 LR-N04-0323 OUL 2 6 2004 O PSEG NuclearJLC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 311 1 040 - 005 - 00 Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Facility Operating License DPR-75 Docket No. 50-311 This Licensee Event Report entitled 'Auto Safety Injection Signal Not Unblocked Prior to Mode Change From 5 to 4" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The attached LER contains no commitments.
Should there be any questions regarding this matter please contact Howard Berrick at 856-339-1862.
Sincerely, Salem Plant Manager Attachment HGB C
Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV. 7/99
Abstract
On May 27, 2004, the Automatic Safety Injection (Auto SI) Block for Salem Unit 2 was not removed prior to entering Mode 4. The Auto Si logic trains are directed by procedure and Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2.1 to be operable (unblocked) prior to transitioning from the Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4).
Mode 4 was entered at approximately 0140 hours0.00162 days <br />0.0389 hours <br />2.314815e-4 weeks <br />5.327e-5 months <br /> on May 27, 2004. At approximately 0630, Operations personnel observed that the Automatic Safety Injection (Auto SI) blue light was illuminated on Reactor Protection Logic Panel, indicating that Automatic Safety Injection (SI) was blocked. TS 3.0.3 was entered since both trains of SI were not operable. Actions were immediately taken to reinstate (unblock) Auto Si. TS 3.0.3 was exited at 0635 after the Auto SI interlock had been re-established.
The cause of the occurrence was the lack of formal independent verification to ensure TS requirements are met prior to changing plant modes. A contributing cause was the CRS who signed off the step of the IOP misread the step and initialed for Automatic SI Block being ACTIVE, contrary to procedure requirements.
An Operations department stand-down (i.e., an interactive discussion between Operation's management team and the shift operators) was conducted to discuss this event.
This event is reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (if more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. The outage CRS immediately notified the on-duty CRS of the condition. TS 3.0.3 was entered since both trains of SI were not operable. Actions were immediately taken to reinstate Auto SI. TS 3.0.3 was exited at 0635 after Auto SI interlock had been re-established.
- 2. Salem Operations performed a stand-down to discuss this and other events. The stand-down was an interactive discussion between Operation's management team and the shift operators.
- 3. IOP-2, Step 5.2 will be revised to remove ambiguity or confusion in intent. Additionally, an independent verification / additional check of Auto SI Block status to IOP-2, Attachment 1, Section 4.3 will be added.
- 4. An assessment of managing administrative requirements associated with Mode ascension lOPs at Salem and Hope Creek Station will be performed to determine if separating administrative requirements from actual operating steps is warranted.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.
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