05000311/FIN-2015002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Untimely Corrective Actions for Service Water Outlet Valve |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when PSEG did not implement corrective actions in a timely manner. Specifically, PSEG identified a degrading trend in the stroke time for the 25 containment fan cooling unit (CFCU) service water (SW) outlet valve, 25SW72, but failed to implement corrective actions to address the trend prior to its failure to stroke in the required time. PSEG troubleshooting identified that air pressure on its air regulator had been set too low for the air volume required to stroke the valve. PSEG adjusted the regulator air and entered this issue in their corrective action program (CAP) as notifications 20661667, 20661710, and 20662206. The issue was determined to be more than minor since it was associated with the system, structure, or component and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and adversely affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the lack of timely corrective actions ultimately resulted in exceeding the valves capability to reposition in the in-service test (IST) and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) required stroke time for containment isolation. The finding was evaluated in accordance with Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, where it screened to very low safety significance (Green) since it was did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components, nor did it involve the hydrogen igniter function. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Teamwork, in that individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, PSEG staff did not collaborate during operational activities such as CAP implementation, work management, and trend analyses to ensure the degrading stroke time was addressed. |
| Site: | Salem  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000311/2015002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Nimitz S Galbreath S Haney S Mccarver T Hedigan A Ziedonis G Dentel P Finney R Barkley |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000311/2015002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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